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I. INTRODUCTION 
State consumer protection acts (CPAs), often referred to as unfair 
and deceptive trade practices acts, are drafted in sweeping language, 
prohibiting all conduct that is “unfair” or “deceptive.”  States adopted 
these laws based on a similar federal statute, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act), in the 1960s and 1970s.  The crucial 
difference between the FTC Act and CPAs is that most state laws, unlike 
the federal law, provide consumers with a private right of action.  Unlike 
government agencies, private plaintiffs are not constricted to bringing 
actions in the public interest.  They do not have to weigh the broad 
public-policy implications of their lawsuits or make judgments about 
how to expend limited resources.  They do not have to answer to elected 
officials and the public.  Unlike public enforcement, which is often 
injunctive in nature and meant to stop practices found to be unfair or 
deceptive, private actions punish businesses for conduct they may not 
have known was wrong. 
In many states, the CPA is quite generous and provides a strong 
incentive to sue.  The broad wording of these statutes, the hope that they 
will be construed liberally in favor of the consumer, and a dearth of case 
law make these open-ended statutes especially attractive to plaintiffs’ 
lawyers who seek to circumvent traditional, rational requirements of the 
common law.  CPAs often do not explicitly require the traditional 
elements of common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, 
such as reliance, intent, injury, and damages.  This allows lawyers to 
argue that proof of such basic elements is unnecessary and that plaintiffs 
should be able to receive a monetary award for a misleading 
advertisement, even if they never saw it.  CPAs often allow recovery of 
statutory damages that can be far in excess of actual damages as well as 
an award of attorneys’ fees.  In some states, every prevailing plaintiff 
receives an award of three times the actual damages (treble damages), 
punishing the defendant even if it made an innocent mistake or did not 
realize its conduct violated the law. 
As this Article will show, variations in statutory language and court 
interpretation of legislative intent have led to widely varying application 
of CPAs, despite their common origin and purpose.  In many instances, 
CPAs have created liability or the threat of liability where none 
previously existed.  This trend has accelerated in some quarters in recent 
years.  A few judges have turned CPAs into springboards for a “universal 
tort,” providing a claim in any lawsuit involving conduct that could 
possibly be categorized as unfair or deceptive.  Claims that would 
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traditionally have been brought as product liability, environmental, or 
contract claims are recast as violations of a consumer protection law and 
circumvent otherwise applicable and well-reasoned legal safeguards.  It 
is irrelevant in some of these lawsuits that either the federal or state 
government permits the conduct attacked.  This allows plaintiffs’ 
lawyers—and judges who follow their leads—to regulate entire 
industries.  For instance, private attorneys have used CPAs to attack the 
fast food industry for the nation’s obesity problem and are reportedly 
planning to sue soft-drink makers for selling soda in schools.1  Creative 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are using CPAs in cases involving medical laboratory 
billing practices and insurance policies.2  Plaintiffs have attempted to 
bring nationwide class actions, regardless of state statutes that vary 
widely in their requirements and remedies, in which they claim that 
“light” cigarette advertisements and packaging imply that cigarettes are 
healthy.3  Most recently, lawyers filed CPA claims against the dairy 
industry for its claims that milk is part of a healthy weight-loss program 
and against supermarkets and dairy companies for failing to warn about 
the effects of lactose intolerance on milk cartons.4 
Judges have often resisted these extensions of existing law.  The 
broad wording of these statutes leaves courts with the power to make 
reasoned choices.  Courts can read a statute in the broadest sense, 
diluting or eliminating many of the fundamental elements of a tort claim 
and awarding damages regardless of causation or injury, or they can 
require plaintiffs to satisfy basic standing and proof requirements.  
Courts can award what are essentially punitive damages and attorneys’ 
fees without a showing of bad conduct, or they can direct punishment 
only at those who intentionally deceive the public.  Courts that reduce or 
eliminate the need to show reliance and damages can then lower the bar 
to certification of class action lawsuits, because these individual issues of 
fact are no longer relevant to a claim, or they can uphold procedural 
safeguards applicable to all class action litigation.  Courts may follow the 
path of private plaintiffs and use CPAs as weapons in individual 
                                                     
 1. See Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005); Caroline E. 
Mayer, Lawyers Ready Suit Over Soda, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at D4. 
 2. See James R. Keller, Illinois Consumer Fraud Act: A Primer on Recent Developments, 87 
ILL. B.J. 474, 474 nn.5 & 7 (1999) (citing Illinois cases). 
 3. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris USA, 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(appealing a judgment against defendant tobacco companies); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-
112, 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 21, 2003) (awarding $10.1 billion), overruled on other 
grounds, 793 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. App.  Ct. 2003), vacated, No. 96644, 2003 Ill. LEXIS 2625 (Ill. Sept. 
16, 2003). 
 4. See infra note 203. 
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disputes, or they may require CPA claims to be in the public interest.  
Courts can choose to disrespect the interests of sister states by giving 
their state’s CPA extraterritorial application, or they can limit use of the 
statute to protecting the interests of their own state’s consumers. 
Where judges have not placed reasonable limits on CPAs, voters 
have taken action to do so.  For example, California voters, by a fifty-
nine percent majority,5 supported Proposition 64 in 2004, amending their 
consumer protection statute, Section 17200.6  That law had resulted in a 
flood of “shakedown” lawsuits against small businesses for technical 
violations of state laws or regulations, such as using too small of a font 
size in advertisements, even when no one had been harmed.  California 
voters realized that when left unchecked, CPAs have resulted in unfair, 
uncertain, unpredictable, and substantial liability for businesses, 
especially small ones. 
After examining the history of the FTC Act and the variations of 
state CPAs, this Article suggests several steps courts can take in deciding 
private claims under CPAs.  It suggests that courts apply a common-
sense construction to CPAs with indeterminate language and require 
fundamental elements of tort law.  In cases where the language of the 
statutes lack the flexibility to allow such a construction, or where the 
judiciary chooses not to act, the Article suggests that state legislatures 
should intervene.  For this purpose, the Article provides several 
principles that legislators should consider in amending CPAs. 
II. THE HISTORIC FOUNDATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS 
State consumer protection statutes have their origin in common law 
fraud and misrepresentation claims as well as in federal consumer 
protection law.  Yet, when states adopted CPAs, they did not explicitly 
include many of the required elements of the common law actions in the 
statutes.  They also failed to fully appreciate Congress’s concerns with 
creating a private right of action for such a broad range of conduct.  This 
combination has resulted in the abuse of CPAs today. 
                                                     
 5. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE AND SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
STATEMENT OF VOTE, 2004 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION, NOV. 2, 2004, at 45 (2004), 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004_general/ssov/formatted_ballot_measures_detail.pdf. 
 6. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005). 
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A. Consumer Protection Prior to the Twentieth Century 
What is known today as actionable misrepresentation or 
nondisclosure previously was known as the tort action of deceit.7  The 
present tort of misrepresentation evolved from the “Writ of Deceit,” 
which dates back to the year 1201.8  This Writ only applied to the use of 
a legal procedure to swindle another.9  Later, the tort developed to 
provide “a remedy for many wrongs which we should now regard as 
breaches of contract, such as false warranties in the sale of goods.”10  
Here, tort law and contract law merged: courts generally limited the 
action to direct transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant.11 
The common law further developed to recognize, in certain 
circumstances, claims for fraudulent misrepresentation or deceit, 
negligent or innocent misrepresentation, and concealment and 
nondisclosure.  An action for fraudulent misrepresentation generally 
requires the plaintiff to show (1) the defendant knew its statement was 
false, inaccurate, or lacked basis in fact; (2) the defendant had an intent 
to deceive; (3) the misstatement was material, meaning that the absent 
information would have affected the plaintiff’s decision to purchase the 
product; (4) the plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentation; (5) the 
reliance was objectively reasonable or justifiable; and (6) the reliance 
was a substantial factor in causing a monetary loss.12 
The common law also developed to allow claims for negligent 
misrepresentation, which courts did not historically recognize under the 
law of deceit.  Although scienter is not a required element of a negligent 
misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must show either (1) that the 
defendant made a false statement because of a lack of reasonable care in 
ascertaining the facts or in the manner of expression or (2) absence of 
skill or competence expected in a given industry or profession.13  The 
                                                     
 7. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 105, at 727 (5th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. § 105, at 727–28. 
 10. Id. § 105, at 728. 
 11. Id.  It was not until 1789, as the notion of caveat emptor subsided, that the tort of deceit was 
first applied where the plaintiff had no dealings with the defendant but had been induced by a 
misrepresentation to extend credit to a third person.  See id. (citing Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 100 
Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B.)). 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–526, 537–538, 546, 548, 548A (1989); see 
also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 470, 472, 474 (2000); PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, 
supra note 7, §§ 107–110. 
 13. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, § 107. 
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plaintiff must also show reasonable reliance, injury, causation, and 
damages.14  Today, nondisclosure may also be the basis for common law 
liability, such as when a special confidential or fiduciary relationship 
exists between the plaintiff and the defendant that justifies reliance based 
on trust or confidence.15 
Although the strength of caveat emptor as a concept in American law 
had diminished by the beginning of the twentieth century, common law 
remedies remained inadequate to protect consumers in some situations.  
For instance, the law governing misrepresentation claims required that a 
person first suffer an injury before bringing a claim.  The law did not 
allow for a proactive approach to stop obviously fraudulent practices 
before an individual was injured.  It was particularly difficult for a 
plaintiff to show a defendant’s intent to deceive—a required element of a 
fraud claim—and the relatively small damages in some cases did not 
warrant the expenses that accompanied a lawsuit.16  In many situations, 
breach of contract actions also were insufficient because a business could 
make false claims about its product or advertise lower-than-actual prices 
without entering into a contract.17 
B. Origin and Development of Federal Government Regulation and 
Enforcement 
The inadequacy of common law tools with which a consumer could 
address false advertising and deceitful commercial schemes in some 
circumstances eventually led Congress in 1914 to establish the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and empower it to regulate such conduct.18  
The FTC consisted, as it does today, of five members appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.19  Congress was 
concerned about the growth and spread of monopolies when it passed the 
FTC Act, so the Act initially charged the Commission with regulating 
                                                     
 14. Id. §§ 108–110. 
 15. Id. § 106; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 1012–13 
(10th ed. 2000) (citations omitted) [hereinafter PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ]. 
 16. Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little FTC Acts”: 
Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 374 (1990). 
 17. An individual bringing a consumer protection action as a breach of contract claim might 
also have to overcome defenses such as the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and privity of 
contract requirements.  See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 451–52 (1991) (discussing these 
various defenses). 
 18. See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000)) (establishing the FTC). 
 19. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (setting the number and qualifications for FTC commissioners). 
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“unfair methods of competition.”20  Thus, in the beginning, the 
Commission focused largely on antitrust and other trade regulation 
violations. 
After the Supreme Court found that the FTC lacked power to 
regulate activities that had no effect on competition between businesses, 
such as false advertising,21 Congress amended the FTC Act to declare 
unlawful all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,” laying 
the foundation of federal consumer protection today.22  The Wheeler-Lea 
Act of 1938 provided the FTC with broad authority to prohibit unfair or 
deceptive acts.23  The Act itself provided little guidance as to which 
activities were “unfair or deceptive,” because Congress recognized that 
“it would undertake an endless task” by attempting to provide an 
exhaustive list of prohibited practices.24  For this reason, Congress 
decided, by a “general declaration,” to condemn unfair practices and 
“leave it to the commission to determine what practices were unfair.”25 
                                                     
 20. § 5, 38 Stat. at 719. 
 21. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 654 (1931) (holding that the FTC has no authority 
to issue a cease-and-desist order with regard to false advertising promoting an ineffective weight-
loss product where the advertising caused harm only to consumers); see also FTC v. R.F. Keppel & 
Brother, Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934) (suggesting that Congress should expand the power of the 
FTC to regulate unfair practices that exploit consumers); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (1935), reprinted in 6 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 
AND RELATED STATUTES 4836–37 (Earl W. Kintner, ed., 1983) [hereinafter Kintner] (advocating for 
a statutory change). 
 22. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, §3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000)).  Today, more than half of the FTC’s 1000-plus full-time 
employees focus on consumer protection.  FTC, FISCAL YEAR 2006 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 
13 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsummary06.pdf.  The FTC 
aggressively uses its cease-and-desist power to protect America’s consumers.  Justin Dingfelder & 
Sandra Brickels, To Protect Consumers, the FTC Means Business, 45 FED. LAW., Jan. 1998, at 24–
25.  In 2004, “the FTC brought 83 actions in federal district court to protect consumers against unfair 
and deceptive trade practices, and obtained 110 orders requiring the return of more than $380 million 
in redress to consumers.”  FTC, FISCAL YEAR 2006 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, supra, at 1.  
“In the first quarter of . . . 2005, the FTC brought 21 actions in federal district court to protect 
consumers and obtained 16 judgments ordering the return of nearly $160 million in consumer 
redress.”  Id. at 5.  “These cases attacked a wide range of fraud and deception, including bogus 
weight loss products, advance-fee credit card scams, business opportunity schemes, deceptive spam, 
fraudulent telemarketing, deceptive credit counseling services, deceptive and unfair debt collection 
practices, and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).”  Id.  The Commission’s 2006 
budget request was $211 million, $119 million of which was designated for consumer protection.  Id. 
at 3.  Funds budgeted for consumer protection have kept pace with inflation during the past three 
years, from $105 million actual in fiscal year 2004, to $115 million estimated in fiscal year 2005, to 
$119 million proposed for fiscal year 2006.  Id. at 20.  The FTC’s overall budget request for fiscal 
year 2006 represented a $6.7 million increase over its 2005 budget.  Id. at 1. 
 23. See § 3, 52 Stat. at 111. 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.). 
 25. S. REP. NO. 597, at 13 (1914), reprinted in 5 Kintner, supra note 21, at 3909–10. 
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The definitions of “unfair” and “deceptive” continue to evolve 
through administrative adjudications, case law, FTC rulemaking, and 
agency “guides.”26  The FTC, based on its understanding of public 
values, has broad discretion to determine when an act is unfair.27  The 
definition of an unfair act, as developed by the FTC28 and codified in the 
United States Code, is one that “causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
or to competition.”29  Unfair acts or practices traditionally included 
coercive or high-pressure selling, withholding material information, 
unsubstantiated claims, and post-purchase rights and remedies.30  They 
                                                     
 26. The FTC is authorized to promulgate general interpretive rules, as well as rules declaring 
particular practices to be “unfair or deceptive” where it believes such practices to be “prevalent.”  15 
U.S.C. § 57a (2000).  The FTC has adopted regulations designating particular practices as unfair or 
deceptive, such as those involving home purchases, consumer credit contracts, and funeral industry 
practices.  See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2005) (providing a home purchaser with the right to cancel a 
contract within three business days); id. § 444 (unfair credit practices); id. § 453 (funeral industry 
practices).  These rules target areas where consumers are particularly vulnerable or where there is a 
danger of coercion through high-pressure sales tactics.  A violation of an FTC rule is considered a 
per se violation of the Act and may also be treated as such under state consumer protection laws.  
See David J. Federbush, The Unexplored Territory of Unfairness in Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair 
Trade Practices Act, 73 FLA. B.J., May 1999, at 26, 32–33.  The FTC has also issued informal 
“guides” on various practices such as deceptive pricing, advertising of warranties, use of the word 
“free,” use of endorsements and testimonials, and fuel economy for new automobiles.  See, e.g., 
Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. § 233 (2005); Guides for the Advertising of Warranties 
and Guarantees, id. § 239; Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations, 
id. § 251; Guides for the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, id. § 255.  These 
guides do not have the same legal force as Commission rules. 
 27. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (“[T]he [FTC] does not 
arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the . . . congressionally 
mandated standard of fairness, it . . . considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the 
letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.”); see generally Stephen Calkins, FTC 
Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935 (2000) (discussing the development of the law of 
unfairness); Michael M. Greenfield, Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and its Impact on 
State Law, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1869 (2000) (same). 
 28. During the 1970s, the FTC was particularly aggressive in attacking what it considered 
unfair practices, leading to calls for congressional intervention.  See 6 Kintner, supra note 21, at 
4938 (stating that during the 1970s the FTC aggressively attacked numerous practices that were 
neither anticompetitive nor outright deceptive).  In 1980, in response to an announced congressional 
oversight hearing, the Commission issued a “Policy Statement on Unfairness.”  Letter from Michael 
Pertschule, Chairman, et al., to Sens. Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth, FTC Policy Statement 
on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter Unfairness Statement], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.  This informal letter, signed by each of the five 
FTC Commissioners, was the basis of the definition codified by Congress in 1994.  S. REP. NO. 103-
130, at 13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776, 1787 (“This section [intends] to codify, as a 
statutory limitation on unfair acts or practices, the principles of the FTC’s December 17, 1980, 
policy statement on unfairness, reaffirmed by a letter from the FTC dated March 5, 1982.”). 
 29. See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108 
Stat. 1691, 1695 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)) (explaining when an act or practice can be 
declared unlawful on the ground that it is unfair). 
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have evolved to include theft, breaking of other laws, using insufficient 
care, interfering with consumer rights, and advertising that promotes 
unsafe practices.31 
The definition of a deceptive act has similarly developed over time.  
Historically, the test for deception was whether the act or practice had 
the tendency or capacity to deceive the general public.32  The “general 
public” was sometimes defined as “‘that vast multitude which includes 
the ignorant, [the] unthinking, and the credulous, who, in making 
purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by 
appearances and general impressions.’”33  This changed in 1983 when 
the Commission issued a policy statement shifting away from a rather 
extreme and fatuous standard to a more moderate, “reasonable” 
consumer standard.34  Courts have adopted the reasoning of this 
“Deception Statement,”35 under which a practice or omission is deceptive 
if (1) it is likely to mislead consumers; (2) the consumer’s interpretation 
of the representation is reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the 
representation is “material” in that it is likely to affect either a 
consumer’s choice of whether to purchase a product or the consumer’s 
health or safety in its use.36  The potential impact of a representation is 
viewed from the perspective of the targeted group.37  For example, 
greater scrutiny is given to practices targeting those who are particularly 
                                                                                                                       
 30. See Calkins, supra note 27, at 1961 (citing PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: 
LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 5 (1999)). 
 31. Id. at 1962. 
 32. Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 813 N.E.2d 476, 487 (Mass. 2004) (citing FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1965)).  See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 
687 (3d Cir. 1982) (supporting the FTC’s finding that by implication and innuendo a deceptive 
impression had been created); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(finding advertisement deceptive because it had the “tendency and capacity to deceive a substantial 
portion of the purchasing public”). 
 33. See Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d at 487 (quoting 1 RUDOLF CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND 
TRADE-MARKS § 19.2(a)(1), at 341–44 (2d ed. 1950)); see also Geismar v. Abraham & Strauss, 439 
N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that New York’s deceptive advertising and unfair 
trade practices laws “were enacted to safeguard the ‘vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the 
unthinking and the credulous.’ . . . The test is not whether the average man would be deceived.”) 
(quoting Floersheim v. Weinburger, 346  F. Supp. 950, 957 (D.D.C. 1972)). 
 34. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman of House 
Comm’n on Energy & Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter 
Deception Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. 
 35. Only the Chairman of the Commission, James C. Miller III, signed the FTC’s 1983 
Deception Statement.  See id.  A split Commission adopted the policy statement in Cliffdale Assocs., 
Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 184 (1984), and federal courts have applied it since that time.  See, e.g., FTC v. 
Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994); Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 
1992); Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 36. Deception Statement, supra note 34. 
 37. Id. 
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susceptible to exaggerated claims, such as elderly people or children.38  
Practices and representations directed to a sophisticated or well-educated 
audience, such as physicians, are judged in light of the expected 
knowledge of that group.39 
C. Why Congress Placed Enforcement Solely With the Government and 
Not With Private Lawyers Under the FTC Act 
Even prior to the 1938 amendments, the Supreme Court observed 
that the meaning and application of unfairness “belongs to that class of 
phrases which do not admit of precise definition,” but are arrived at as a 
result of “the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.”40  
Members of Congress extensively debated the definition of “unfair” 
during consideration of the 1914 Act, and many were concerned that 
such a broad provision—without clarification—was an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power, which would allow for arbitrary or 
abusive enforcement.41 
One significant factor in calming the concerns of Congress was that 
the power to determine unfair practices would be placed in a nonpartisan 
Commission, composed of “a body of five men, intelligent men, . . . 
[including] lawyers, economists, publicists, and men experienced in 
industry, who will . . . be able to determine justly whether the practice is 
contrary to good morals or not.”42  An additional factor ameliorating 
Congress’s concern at the time of the 1938 expansion of the Act to 
include consumer protection was that the FTC’s power was “merely 
preventative and cooperative rather than penal.”43  The FTC Act’s 
remedies continue to be primarily injunctive in nature and the 
Commission generally acts through instituting an administrative 
proceeding or an action in federal court seeking an order that the 
respondent “cease and desist from the violation of the law so charged.”44  
The FTC may seek equitable relief including a preliminary or permanent 
                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931), superseded by statute, Wheeler-Lea Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as recognized in Simeon Mgmt. Corp. v. FTC, 579 
F.2d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 41. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 11,084–109, 11,112–16 (1914). 
 42. Id. at 11,108–09 (statement of Sen. Newlands).  Senator Newlands continued, “I would 
rather have the opinion of such a commission upon a question of good morals in business than to 
have the opinion of the court upon such a question.”  Id. 
 43. S. REP. NO. 74-2, at 1 (1936). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 53(b) (2000). 
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injunction, freezing of assets, and corrective advertising.45  The 
Commission also has authority to seek restitution for injured consumers 
and may impose substantial fines for violation of its orders.46  In 
addition, the Commission’s broad authority to bring actions for 
violations of the Act is tempered by budgetary and staffing restraints and 
a requirement that the Commission pursue actions only when they 
significantly further the public interest.47 
Through these means, enforcement was placed solely with the 
government, not with private lawyers.  In fact, a private right of action 
was considered and rejected when Congress considered the FTC Act in 
1914.  At that time, Senator Clapp of Minnesota proposed an amendment 
that provided as follows: 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by any 
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared 
to be unlawful by this act may sue therefore in any district court of the 
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or may be 
found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained and the costs of the suit, 
together with a reasonable attorney’s fee.48 
                                                     
 45. See id. § 57b(b). 
 46. In 1975, Congress expanded the FTC’s authority to permit the Commission to seek 
restitution to those injured by a company’s deceptive acts through a civil action in court.  See 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
637, § 19, 88 Stat. 2201, 2201–02 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57b (2000)).  In some 
cases, a court may order a company to pay consumers substantial sums.  See Peter C. Ward, 
Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good Intentions of 
Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (1992) (discussing a federal case where 
the court awarded restitution in the amount of $1.96 million against a retail art business that engaged 
in deceptive sales practices).  More often, when faced with an FTC action, a company may opt to 
settle with the Commission.  If a business fails to abide by an order of the Commission or federal 
court, the FTC can institute a punitive action and seek fines of up to $10,000 per violation.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 45(l) (2000) (capping fines at $10,000).  The amount of the civil fine is generally based on 
“the good or bad faith of the respondent; the injury to the public; the respondent’s ability to pay; the 
desire to eliminate the benefits derived by a violation; and the necessity of vindicating the FTC’s 
authority.”  Dingfelder & Brickels, supra note 22, at 26 (citing United States v. Reader’s Digest 
Ass’n, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 770, 772 (D. Del. 1980), aff’d, 662 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1981)).  These civil 
penalties can easily escalate into the millions of dollars because each day of violating an FTC order 
is considered a separate offense.  See id. at 27 (discussing a $2.4 million penalty paid by General 
Nutrition, Inc., regarding claims made for vitamin supplements; a $2.75 million penalty against a 
manufacturer for claims made in advertising its “Miracle Ear” hearing aids; and a $1.5 million 
penalty against a manufacturer of skin care products for unsubstantiated claims regarding a baldness 
treatment, a wrinkle lotion, and a burn cream).  In some circumstances, the FTC may seek criminal 
penalties for advertising that is intentionally deceptive and dangerous to the public’s health.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 54(a) (2000). 
 47. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000) (requiring the Commission to find that bringing an action in 
federal court to enjoin a violation of the FTC Act is in the public interest). 
 48. See 51 CONG. REC. 13,113 (1914). 
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Senator Clapp viewed this amendment, modeled after the Sherman 
antitrust law, as “putting [a] remedy in the hands of the aggrieved party” 
and providing “a very strong incentive to the observance of and 
obedience to the law by those against whom the law is directed as a 
regulating and controlling force.”49 
The proposed amendment was opposed on a number of grounds.  
The first was a question of interpretation.  Congress feared courts might 
allow consumers to go directly to court without prior FTC action, which 
would have allowed judges rather than commissioners to decide whether 
conduct was fair.50  Even if courts construed the Act to require a FTC 
ruling that conduct was unlawful before consumers could bring a private 
right of action, the concerns of some were not relieved.  As one member 
noted, “[I]f no man on earth can know whether he is disobeying the law 
or not until some time in the future, when some commission finds out 
and tells him that he is disobeying the law, does not the Senator think 
that mulcting him in treble damages is a little bit harsh?”51  In addition, 
some members of Congress thought opening two forums for deciding 
violations under the Act, the Commission and federal courts, could lead 
to confusion and conflict.52 
Other members opposed the amendment’s provision of treble 
damages.53  For example, restraint of trade or monopoly under the 
Sherman antitrust law, upon which the amendment was modeled, was a 
criminal act subject to stiff penalties, and thus treble damages in that 
situation may have been appropriate.54  The FTC Act, however, is unlike 
other laws providing for treble damages, which ordinarily involve a 
criminal act or, at the very least, “a high degree of moral turpitude . . . 
the same [in] character as punitive or exemplary damages.”55  It was also 
noted that such a provision could lead corporations to vigorously fight 
 
                                                     
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 13,114–15 (colloquy between Sens. McCumber and Clapp); id. at 13,115 
(colloquy between Sens. Brandegee and Clapp). 
 51. See id. at 13,114 (statement of Sen. McCumber).  Senator McCumber continued, “[I]f this 
amendment is incorporated in the bill, you immediately provide for the punishment of an offense of 
which the offender can know nothing, at least until some quasi legislative body has passed judgment 
upon the question whether or not he has a right to do a particular thing.”  Id.  See also id. at 13,118 
(statement of Sen. Williams) (“It looks to me as if this provision might be retroactive in a rather 
oppressive manner.”). 
 52. See id. at 13,120 (statements of Sens. Stone and Reed). 
 53. See id. at 13,115–16 (statement of Sen. Newlands). 
 54. See id. at 13,116–17 (statement of Sen. Walsh). 
 55. Id. at 13,116 (statement of Sen. Walsh). 
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FTC rulings in court “to the bitter end,” rather than immediately abandon 
the practice.56 
Some members of Congress believed that citizens injured by an 
unfair act could already exercise their rights at common law to bring an 
action for recovery.57  In addition, members of Congress expressed 
concern that “a certain class of lawyers, especially in large communities, 
will arise to ply the vocation of hunting up and working up such suits,” 
particularly given a broad right of action for “unfair” conduct.58  
Members feared that “[t]he number of these suits . . . no man can 
estimate.”59  What makes this legislative history so interesting today is 
that many members of Congress foretold the very problems that would 
arise when legislators added private causes of action to state CPAs. 
After further consideration, Senator Clapp revised his proposed 
amendment to clarify that a private right of action would only exist after 
the Commission had declared the conduct unlawful.60  Nevertheless, the 
Senate decisively rejected the proposed amendment by a forty-one to 
eighteen bipartisan vote.61  Although Congress significantly expanded 
the reach of the FTC Act in passing the Wheeler-Lea Act of 193862 and 
later strengthened FTC-enforcement mechanisms, expanded redress, and 
increased civil penalties with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975,63 in the FTC Act’s ninety 
years of existence, Congress has chosen not to amend it to recognize a 
private right of action. 
The federal judiciary upheld congressional intent and expressed 
similar concern over the potential for abuse when it rejected in 1973 a 
request that it find an implied private right of action under the FTC Act.64  
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
                                                     
 56. See id. at 13,115–16 (statements of Sens. Brandegee and Newlands). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 11,112 (statement of Sen. Newlands) (“[P]roceedings under this act will not, 
of course, interfere with the private right of any man who is injured by a competitor by practices 
such as have been referred to bring a suit either at law or in equity for enforcement of his rights.”).  
One Senator suggested that findings of the Commission might be introduced as prima facie evidence 
of unlawful conduct in a civil suit.  See id. at 13,151 (statement of Sen. Cummins). 
 58. Id. at 13,120 (statement of Sen. Stone). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 13,143. 
 61. Id. at 13,149.  See also id. at 13,150 (colloquy between Sens. Cummins and Clapp debating 
need for private remedy in addition to public enforcement); Ward, supra note 46, at 1150–51. 
 62. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 63. See supra note 46. 
 64. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Private 
enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act would pose serious problems to the enforcement 
activities of the FTC, and is inconsistent with the legislative scheme established by Congress.”). 
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found that a private remedy would over penalize companies that had 
committed practices not considered unfair, deceptive, or misleading prior 
to their commission.65  In rejecting a private right of action, the court also 
noted that the FTC was composed of a body of experts and economists 
who could create policy in a reasoned, orderly, and forward-looking 
fashion.66  The court found that private lawsuits, on the other hand, 
created policy in a piecemeal and retroactive manner.67 
This Article does not advocate for the elimination of private rights of 
action under CPAs.  Nonetheless, all of these concerns ring true as we 
consider how private rights of action should be interpreted under state 
CPAs. 
III. STATES ADOPT CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
During the 1960s and 1970s, many states adopted their own CPAs,68 
often referred to as “little-FTC Acts.”69  Most little-FTC Acts were based 
on alternative forms suggested by the FTC70 or model state legislation 
developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws.71  Although these laws take various forms, each broadly 
prohibits unfair or deceptive acts, as does the FTCA Act.72  Most state 
statutes also include a nonexclusive—but sometimes extensive—list of 
prohibited practices.73  The crucial difference, however, is that almost all 
                                                     
 65. See id. at 998 (stating that the advantage of the FTC acting in an advisory capacity to those 
in compliance with the Act would be endangered). 
 66. Id. at 998–99. 
 67. Id. at 997–98. 
 68. J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial 
Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 357 (1992). 
 69. See id. at 347 n.1 (citing Karns, supra note 16). 
 70. See Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation: Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law, at C4–C5 (1969); see generally William A. Lovett, Private Actions for 
Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 275 (1971). 
 71. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (amended 1966), 7A U.L.A. 139 (2002). 
 72. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (LexisNexis 
1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 
2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1) (West 
1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 646.608(1)(u) (2003).  The District of Columbia’s statute, however, does not explicitly recognize a 
violation of the act for “unfair” trade practices, and courts have not permitted such actions.  See D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 28-3904 (LexisNexis 2001); Atwater v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulator Affairs, 
566 A.2d 462, 465 (D.C. 1989). 
 73. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.471(b); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-107(a), -109 
(Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105(1)(a)–(ww) (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(a)–(ee); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393.1 (2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603 (2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
714.16(2)(b)–(n) (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44(1) (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
75-24-5(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B) (LexisNexis 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
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state CPAs provide consumers with a private right of action to enforce 
their provisions. 
The federal and state laws were meant to complement each other.74  
In the “heyday of consumerism,” the FTC urged states to adopt their own 
little-FTC Acts as a way of combining resources to target unfair and 
deceptive practices at both the local and national levels.75  Most state 
laws include a provision directing state regulators to look to the FTC for 
guidance in terms of substantive law, encouraging state regulators to 
emphasize enforcement and remedies, rather than focus on 
policymaking.76  All fifty states and the District of Columbia now have 
adopted little-FTC Acts.77 
Unlike the FTC Act, which provides for enforcement only by state 
agencies, nearly every state CPA provides consumers with a private right 
of action in addition to government enforcement.78  Only Iowa relies 
exclusively on its Attorney General to enforce its consumer protection 
law in court.79  Although the little-FTC Acts of Arizona and Delaware do 
not explicitly provide for a private right of action, courts in those states 
have found that citizens have an implied right to bring lawsuits for 
violations of the statutes.80 
                                                                                                                       
753 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608(1); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon 
2002) (amended by H.R. 2018, 78th Leg. ch. 728 Tex.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-102 
(LexisNexis 1999).  States may also have numerous other consumer protection statutes addressing 
particular practices. 
 74. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451 (2004) (recognizing that the purpose of the Vermont 
Consumer Fraud Act is to “complement the enforcement of federal statutes and decisions governing 
unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in order to protect the 
public, and to encourage fair and honest competition”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-101(1) (same). 
 75. Franke & Ballam, supra note 68, at 356–57. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Karns, supra note 16, at 373–74 n.2 (citing state statutes). 
 78. See Sovern, supra note 17, at 448–52 (describing the opportunities states provide to 
consumers).  In several states, legislatures first enacted laws providing only for state attorney general 
enforcement but later added a private right of action.  For example, New Jersey enacted its 
Consumer Fraud Act in 1960 “‘to permit the Attorney General to combat the increasingly 
widespread practice of defrauding the consumer.’”  Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 460 
(N.J. 1994) (quoting Senate Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 199 (1960)).  The New Jersey 
law was amended to provide for citizen lawsuits in 1971.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 
2001).  See also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 2004) (amended 1980); 73 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 201-9.2 (West Supp. 2005) (amended 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010 (West 
1999) (amended 1970). 
 79. See Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 222, 227–28 (Iowa 
1998). 
 80. See Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 521 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Ariz. 1974); 
Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857, 859 (Del. 1975).  In fact, for the first seven years of its existence, it 
was believed that only the state Attorney General could bring actions under Arizona’s CPA.  See 
Edwin M. Gaines, Jr., Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act: A Standard of Conduct, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 
321, 323 (1980). 
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A. Elements Necessary to Bring a Private Claim 
The elements necessary to bring private lawsuits under little-FTC 
Acts vary from state to state.  In some cases, the required elements of a 
claim are explicitly stated in the legislation.  In many other cases, the 
requirements for bringing a private lawsuit are based on the judiciary’s 
interpretation of the law.  The great variation in the interpretation of 
CPAs is significant for two reasons.  First, it demonstrates the clear 
choices courts often have when applying CPAs.  Second, the vast 
differences in the application of state laws makes it particularly 
inappropriate for courts to certify multi-state class actions alleging CPA 
claims or to apply the CPA of one state to conduct that occurred in 
another state. 
Even the very definition of a prohibited act varies from state to state.  
In Washington, a practice is unfair if it “‘offends public policy as . . . 
[expressed] by statutes, . . . [or] is immoral, unethical, oppressive or 
unscrupulous; . . . [and] causes substantial injury to consumers.’”81  It is 
deceptive if it has the potential “to deceive a substantial portion of the 
public.”82  Texas law limits the definition of “false, misleading, or 
deceptive” to specific, enumerated acts in private rights of action but 
does not apply this limitation in enforcement actions brought by its 
Attorney General.83  This assures that businesses have notice of 
prohibited conduct before being sued for damages.  A handful of states 
require consumers to attempt to settle with the company or exhaust 
administrative procedures before instituting a lawsuit.84  Many state laws 
provide that the state is to interpret its law consistent with that of the 
FTC or look to the FTC for guidance in deciding prohibited practices.85  
                                                     
 81. Blake v. Fed. Way Cycle Ctr., 698 P.2d 578, 583 (Wash. 1985) (quoting FTC v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972)). 
 82. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 535 (Wash. 
1986) (en banc).  See also 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(4)(xxi) (West Supp. 2005) (prohibiting 
“engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of 
misunderstanding”). 
 83. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(d) (Vernon 2002). 
 84. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(b) (2000) (requiring a claimant to deliver a written 
demand for relief identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or 
practice relied upon and the injury suffered to any prospective respondent at least thirty days prior to 
the filing of a private action); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-5(a) (LexisNexis 1996) (requiring the 
consumer to give notice to the supplier the sooner of six months after initial discovery of the 
deceptive act, one year following the transaction, or within thirty days of any time limitation with 
respect to a warranty); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(2) (2000) (requiring consumers to make “a 
reasonable attempt to resolve any claim through an informal dispute settlement program approved by 
the Attorney General”). 
 85. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-115 (2001); 
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The most significant difference between state laws, however, is how they 
are applied in private lawsuits when issues of reliance, intent, and 
damages arise. 
1. The Need to Show Reliance 
Only a few states, such as Indiana, Texas, and Wyoming, explicitly 
require a showing of actual reliance in the text of the statute.86  Courts in 
a number of other states have ruled that CPA laws require private 
litigants to show that they relied on the alleged unfair or deceptive act 
and that this reliance was “reasonable” or “justifiable.”87  Similarly, 
Kansas courts have interpreted the statutory requirement that a person 
bringing a private lawsuit under the act be “aggrieved” to require a 
showing of reliance.88  In addition, courts in some states, such as 
Arizona, require a showing of actual reliance but do not necessarily 
require the reliance to be “reasonable.”89  Minnesota and North Dakota 
require a showing that the defendant intended that consumers rely on the 
alleged deceptive act, even if no one was actually misled.90 
                                                                                                                       
VT. STAT ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(b) (Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-101(1) (LexisNexis 
1999). 
 86. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (requiring reliance “upon an uncured or incurable 
deceptive act”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (requiring 
that the deceptive act or practice be “relied on by a consumer to the consumer’s detriment”); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(a) (2005) (“A person relying upon an uncured unlawful deceptive trade 
practice may bring an action under this act for the damages he has actually suffered as a consumer as 
a result of such unlawful deceptive trade practice.”); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b) (1993) 
(providing a private right of action to “[a]ny consumer who contracts for goods or services in 
reliance upon false or fraudulent representations or practices prohibited by . . . [the act] . . . or who 
sustains damages or injury as a result of any false or fraudulent representations or practices 
prohibited by [the act]”). 
 87. See, e.g., Lynas v. Williams, 454 S.E.2d 570, 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that 
“justifiable reliance” is an essential element of a claim under Georgia’s Fair Business Practices Act); 
Philip Morris, Inc., v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 234–39 (Md. 2000) (denying class certification while 
noting that action under consumer protection statutes would require a showing of individual 
reliance); Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 445–46 (Pa. 2001) (holding that because 
Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law is rooted in fraud prevention, it 
is likely the legislature intended to retain the common law elements of fraud, including reliance); see 
also Tim Torres Enters. v. Linscott, 416 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (noting with 
approval the trial court’s instruction that “there must be some actual consumer reliance . . . before 
awarding pecuniary damages”). 
 88. See Finstad v. Washburn Univ., 845 P.2d 685, 691–92 (Kan. 1993). 
 89. See, e.g., Parks v. Macro-dynamics, Inc., 591 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Peery 
v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 574, 577–78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) . 
 90. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (1999); LeSage v. Norwest Bank Calhoun-Isles, 409 
N.W.2d 536, 539–41 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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Courts in most other jurisdictions do not require a showing of 
reliance.91  Often, these courts use in private lawsuits a standard similar 
to the test under the FTC Act: whether the act has the tendency or 
capacity to mislead consumers, regardless of whether the plaintiff 
actually and reasonably relied on the misrepresentation.92  Many state 
courts have ruled that their CPAs do not require private litigants to show 
they relied upon the alleged unfair or deceptive practice but do require 
plaintiffs to show the injury or loss had a causal connection to a violation 
of the act.93  Some do not require a plaintiff to plead actual reliance as a 
separate element of a CPA claim but consider reliance intricately 
interwoven with the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate proximate 
cause.94  In at least three states, it remains unclear whether reliance is 
required to bring a private lawsuit under their respective little-FTC 
Acts.95 
                                                     
 91. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 869 So. 2d 592, 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(“When addressing a deceptive or unfair trade practice claim, the issue is not whether the plaintiff 
actually relied on the alleged practice, but whether the practice was likely to deceive a consumer 
acting reasonably in the same circumstances. . . .  [U]nlike fraud, a party asserting a deceptive trade 
practice claim need not show actual reliance on the representation or omission at issue.” (citing 
Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 776 So. 2d 971, 973–74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000))). 
 92. See, e.g., Alicke v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 111 F.3d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Smoot v. 
Physicians Life Ins. Co., 87 P.3d 545, 550 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003); Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 394 
S.E.2d 643, 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Richards v. Beechmont Volvo, 711 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1998); Peabody v. P.J.’s Auto Village, Inc., 569 A.2d 460, 462 (Vt. 1989); see also PNR, 
Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt, 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003) (finding that a showing of reliance is 
not required but that the plaintiff must show that a consumer acting reasonably under the 
circumstances would have been misled); Sw. Starving Artists Group, Inc. v. State ex rel. Summer, 
364 So. 2d 1128, 1130 (Miss. 1978) (requiring a showing that the plaintiff would have acted 
differently had he or she known the actual facts); Blue Cross, Inc. v. Corcoran, 558 N.Y.S.2d 404, 
405 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding that a showing of reliance is not required but that the plaintiff 
must show that a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances would have been misled). 
 93. See Haesche v. Kissner, 640 A.2d 89, 93–94 (Conn. 1994); Morris v. Osmose Wood 
Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 634 (Md. 1995); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 366–67 
(N.J. 1977). 
 94. See, e.g., Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 161–63 (Ill. 2002) (finding that 
proximate causation requires a plaintiff to show that he or she was actually deceived and recognizing 
that in the common law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation “cause-in-fact is defined as reliance”). 
 95. For example, courts have split on the need to show reliance under Missouri and North 
Carolina law.  Compare Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1107 (W.D. Mo. 
2000) (requiring a plaintiff to prove the elements of common law fraud), and Tucker v. Boulevard at 
Piper Glen LLC, 564 S.E.2d 248, 251 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring a showing of actual reliance), 
with State ex rel. Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (not 
requiring elements of common law fraud), and Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 589 S.E.2d 423, 
431 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding proof of reliance is not required), reh’g denied, 598 S.E.2d 138 
(N.C. 2004). Vermont courts have not ruled on whether the state’s CPA requires a showing of 
reliance in a private lawsuit.  See Lalande Air & Water Corp. v. Pratt, 795 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Vt. 
2002). 
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2. The Requisite Intent 
CPAs often do not address the intent necessary, if any, to violate 
state law.  Several courts have found that the CPA plaintiff does not need 
to show any intent on the part of the defendant.96 
An equal or greater number of states require that the defendant act 
with some type of intent.  A few state statutes require defendants to act 
willfully, knowingly, or intentionally.97  For example, a business violates 
South Dakota’s Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
statute only when it knowingly and intentionally commits a deceptive act 
or practice, regardless of whether a person is actually misled.98  Courts 
interpreting Kansas, Michigan, and Virginia law have also found that the 
respective CPAs require that the defendant intended to deceive 
consumers.99  On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court has found, 
and the Delaware, Minnesota, and North Dakota statutes provide, that the 
defendant must have intended that consumers rely on its action, whether 
or not it intended to deceive them.100  Finally, some state courts have 
required a degree of intent in cases where a business is alleged to have 
omitted or concealed material facts but not in cases involving affirmative 
misrepresentations.101 
                                                     
 96. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Healey Ford-Subaru, Inc., 652 A.2d 496, 506 (Conn. 1995); Brady v. 
Publishers Clearing House, 787 A.2d 111, 116 (Del. Ch. 2001); Regency Nissan, Inc. v. Taylor, 391 
S.E.2d 467, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 365 (N.J. 
1977); Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400–02 (N.C. 1981); D&K Roofing, Inc. v. Pleso, 601 
N.E.2d 561, 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); see also Smith v. Scott Lewis Chevrolet, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 9, 
12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no showing of intent is necessary to recover, except knowledge or 
willfulness is required to recover treble damages); Winton v. Johnson Dix Fuel Corp., 515 A.2d 371, 
376 (Vt. 1986) (finding the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act “does not require a showing of intent to 
mislead, but only an intent to publish the statement challenged”); McRae v. Bolstad, 676 P.2d 496, 
500 (Wash. 1984) (“[P]roof of intent to deceive or defraud is not necessary if the action ‘has the 
capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the purchasing public.’” (quoting Haner v. Quincy Farm 
Chems., Inc., 649 P.2d 828, 831 (Wash. 1982))). 
 97. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605(10), -638(1) (2003) (willfully); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-
24-6(1) (2004) (knowingly and intentionally); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-4(2) (2001) (knowingly or 
intentionally); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105(a) (2005) (knowingly). 
 98. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-6(1). 
 99. See, e.g., Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 598 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(interpreting Virginia law); Porras v. Bell, 857 P.2d 676, 678 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Dix v. Am. 
Bankers Assurance Co., 415 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. 1987); see also Rizzo v. Michener, 584 A.2d 
973, 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (ruling that an action under the state’s little-FTC Act requires 
satisfaction of the common law elements of fraud, including scienter). 
 100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513 (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.69 (West 2004); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (1999); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (Ill. 1996); 
Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 607 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1992).  See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-
6-102(f) (LexisNexis 1999) (requiring intent that others rely in some actions). 
 101. In Alaska, if a lawsuit is based on concealing a material fact, a defendant must have acted 
knowingly.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(12) (2004).  Similarly, in Arizona and Delaware, CPA 
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3. The Need to Show Injury In Fact and Damages 
Most courts require some showing of an injury, however small.  For 
example, some statutes require a plaintiff to show an “ascertainable 
loss,” which courts have found to provide a very low threshold for 
plaintiffs to cross.102  Several state laws appear to allow citizens to bring 
lawsuits under CPAs on behalf of the general public whether or not 
anyone has actually been harmed,103 and others simply provide that “any 
person” may bring a private lawsuit for a violation of the act.104  This 
opens the door for courts to allow plaintiffs who have never been harmed 
to sue and recover at least statutory damages. 
After years of substantial abuse of its Unfair Competition Law, 
California voters recently amended their CPA to require those bringing 
private actions to show they had suffered an injury.105  On the other hand, 
the District of Columbia amended its statute in October 2000 to include a 
similar citizen suit provision authorizing a plaintiff to bring a claim on 
behalf of “itself, its members, or the general public” for a violation of the 
law of the District of Columbia.106  One federal court noted that this 
amendment might eliminate the requirements of injury in fact and 
causation.107  Another court recently found that, despite the amendment, 
a plaintiff must still show injury in fact and causation to have standing to 
bring a suit under the statute.108 
                                                                                                                       
claimants must show that the defendant intended that consumers rely on an omission of material fact.  
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522(A) (2003); Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 
1074 (Del. 1983). 
 102. See, e.g., Hinchliffe v. Am. Motors Corp., 440 A.2d 810, 813–14 (Conn. 1981) (finding that 
consumers can meet the “ascertainable loss,” requirement of the statute without proving actual 
damages of a specific monetary amount); Feitler v. Animation Celection, Inc., 13 P.3d 1044, 1050 
(Or. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that a showing of “ascertainable loss” is satisfied so long as it is 
“capable of being discovered, observed, or established”). 
 103. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001). 
 104. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113 (2004) (defining “any person” as an actual or 
potential consumer injured by defendant’s goods, services, or property; as a successor in interest to 
an actual consumer who purchased from defendant; or as a person injured by defendant’s deceptive 
trade practice in the person’s occupation or business). 
 105. See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
 106. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1). 
 107. Wells v. Allstate Ins. Co., 210 F.R.D. 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2002).  The pre-amendment version 
of the District of Columbia’s CPA permitted recovery by “‘[a]ny consumer who suffers any damage 
as a result of the use or employment of any person of a trade practice’” in violation of the act.  Id. at 
8 (quoting the historical and statutory notes to D.C. Code § 28-3905 (2000)). 
 108. Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 176–78 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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B. Available Remedies 
Remedies available to private litigants also vary significantly.  
Minnesota law does not provide for money damages but only for 
injunctive relief.109  Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 
limit a private litigant’s recovery to actual damages, restitution, or 
equitable relief.110  Actual damages may include the difference between 
the market value of the good or service and either its value as received or 
the cost of repairing the goods.111  Damages for pain and suffering or 
emotional distress may also be available in some states.112 
Most states provide for much more generous recovery.  Several 
states provide that private litigants may recover statutory damages, which 
are the greater of actual damages or an amount ranging from $25 in 
Massachusetts to $2000 in Utah.113  State laws allow plaintiffs to receive 
the statutory minimum without proving actual damages.114  Nebraska law 
allows the court, in its discretion, to increase the award “to an amount 
which bears a reasonable relation to the actual damages” up to $1000 
 
                                                     
 109. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.45 (West 2004); Simmons v. Modern Aero, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 
336, 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 110. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. § 501.211(2) (2002); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (LexisNexis 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1213 (1997); MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408 (LexisNexis 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(1) (West 1999); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1609 (LexisNexis 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31 (2004); TEX. 
BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(2) (West Supp. 
2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (2005). 
 111. Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Viene v. Concours 
Auto Sales, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 814, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 112. See Laurents v. La. Mobile Homes, 689 So. 2d 536, 542 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that 
actual damages may include damages for mental anguish and humiliation); Avery v. Indus. 
Mortgage Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 840, 844–45 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that noneconomic damages 
are available under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act).  
 113. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2002) (greater of actual damages or $100); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West Supp. 2005) (actual damages but not less than $1000); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 6-1-113(2) (2004) (greater of actual damages or $500); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) 
(1997) (greater of actual damages or $25); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(2) (West 2002) 
(greater of actual damages or $250); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (2003) (greater of actual 
damages or $500); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(B) (West 2000) (greater of actual damages or 
$100); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 2004) (greater of actual damages or $50); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (2003) (greater of actual damages or $200); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-
9.2(a) (West Supp. 2005) (greater of actual damages or $100); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(a) 
(2001) (greater of actual damages or $200); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2) (2001) (greater of 
actual damages or $2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(A) (Supp. 2005) (greater of actual damages 
or $500); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-106(1) (Supp. 2005) (greater of actual damages or $200). 
 114. See, e.g., Preferred Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Docusearch, Inc., 829 A.2d 1068, 1075 (N.H. 2003). 
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when “damages are not susceptible of measurement by ordinary 
pecuniary standards.”115 
States also have adopted different mechanisms for punishing bad 
conduct in private lawsuits under CPAs.  About two-thirds of state laws 
provide for the tripling of actual damages (or the state-set minimum) or 
for punitive damages.  Even among these states, the trigger for the 
imposition of punishment varies significantly.  In nine states, treble 
damages are available if the jury finds that the defendant acted 
intentionally, willfully, knowingly, or in bad faith.116  In Colorado, for 
example, treble damages are available if it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in “bad faith” 
conduct.117  Louisiana awards treble damages if the director or Attorney 
General previously put the defendant on notice of the violation.118  
Similarly, Ohio, through its administrative rules, provides for treble 
damages for acts previously found to constitute violations by the 
Attorney General or by court decision when the decision is available in 
the Attorney General’s public inspection files.119 
On the other hand, Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, 
Louisiana, New Jersey, and North Carolina award three times actual 
damages, and Wisconsin awards two times actual damages, to every 
                                                     
 115. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1609 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 116. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(a)(III) (allowing an award of three times the actual 
damages if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in bad-faith 
conduct); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (2000) (requiring an award of three times actual damages 
for intentional violations); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (providing a court with discretion to 
award up to three times actual damages for willful and knowing violations); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
358-A:10 (LexisNexis 1995) (providing that a court may award up to three times actual damages, 
but not less than two times actual damages, for willful and knowing violations); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
57-12-10(B) (providing for the greater of treble damages or $300 in cases of willful conduct); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (providing for three times actual damages up to $1000 for willful or 
knowing violations); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (1985) (providing for treble damages for willful 
or knowing violations); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(3) (2001) (providing for treble damages 
in cases of willful or knowing violations); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(A) (providing that the trier of 
fact may award up to the greater of three times actual damages or $1000 for willful conduct); see 
also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 2002) (providing that a plaintiff can 
recover for mental anguish and three times economic damages in cases of knowing violations and 
three times damages for mental anguish and economic damages in cases involving intentional 
conduct). 
 117. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(a)(III).  Oklahoma takes an alternative approach.  It allows 
consumers to collect a civil penalty of $2000 per violation if the defendant knowingly took 
advantage of a vulnerable consumer, or knew or should have known that the price was grossly 
excessive, there was no reasonable probability that the consumer would be able to pay for the good 
or service, or that the transaction was excessively one-sided in favor of the violator.  OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 761.1(B) (West Supp. 2005). 
 118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2003). 
 119. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (LexisNexis 2002). 
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prevailing plaintiff in a CPA lawsuit.120  These states tend to look at 
treble damages as a way to encourage private enforcement of their CPAs 
by providing an economic incentive to sue in cases where actual 
damages may be small.121  A few states, such as Alabama, Montana, 
Vermont, and Washington, leave the decision of whether to impose 
treble damages to the court’s broad discretion.122 
In addition, at least fourteen states permit punitive damages in 
lawsuits under CPAs for conduct ranging from recklessness to 
intentional conduct or ill will or in cases involving flagrant or repeated 
violations.123  In six of these jurisdictions, it appears that punitive 
damages may be awarded despite the availability of statutory or treble 
damages.124 
                                                     
 120. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (2004) (providing for the greater of treble damages or 
$500 and any other relief the court deems proper); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k) (LexisNexis 2001) 
(providing for the greater of treble damages or $1500 per violation in addition to the potential for 
punitive damages); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-13 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (providing for the 
greater of treble damages or $1000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (providing for treble 
damages); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2003) (providing for treble damages); WIS. STAT. § 100.20(5) 
(West Supp. 2004) (providing for an award of twice the pecuniary loss). 
 121. See, e.g., United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 437 S.E.2d 374, 379 (N.C. 1993). 
 122. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2002) (permitting the court to award up to 
three times actual damages, in its discretion, based on “the amount of actual damages awarded, the 
frequency of the unlawful acts or practices, the number of persons adversely affected thereby and the 
extent to which the unlawful acts or practices were committed intentionally,” among other relevant 
factors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (2003) (providing the court with discretion to award 
treble damages); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b) (1993) (providing for exemplary damages of up to 
three times actual damages); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (West 1999) (providing the court 
with discretion to award up to three times actual damages not to exceed $10,000). 
 123. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (permitting the court to award “other relief” as it deems 
proper); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a) (West Supp. 2005) (allowing the court, but not a 
jury, to award punitive damages in its discretion); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1)(C), (F) 
(providing the court with discretion to award punitive damages and any other relief the court deems 
proper); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (2000) (authorizing exemplary damages for intentional 
violations); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-608(1) (2003) (authorizing the court to impose punitive 
damages in cases of flagrant or repeated violations); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(a) (West 
Supp. 2005) (noting that a court has discretion to award any relief it deems proper, including 
punitive damages); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220(1) (LexisNexis 1996) (authorizing the court to 
award punitive damages in its discretion); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(1) (West 2001) (providing the 
court with discretion to award punitive damages); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (2003) (authorizing 
a court or jury to award punitive damages); 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2(a) (West Supp. 2005) 
(stating that the court “may provide such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper”); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(a) (2001) (noting that punitive damages are available as necessary); see 
also ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-204 (2001) (allowing punitive damages in cases involving elderly or 
disabled claimants); Schmidt v. Amn. Leasco, 679 P.2d 532, 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that 
the jury has discretion to award punitive damages under Arizona’s CPA if the defendant’s conduct is 
reckless or shows spite or ill will); Stephenson v. Capano Dev. Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1076–77 (Del. 
1983) (recognizing that a court may award punitive damages under the CPA statute if fraud is gross, 
oppressive, or aggravated, or in cases of breach of trust or confidence). 
 124. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a), (c); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
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In most states, CPA remedies are considered cumulative in nature to 
other legal remedies.125  Thus, plaintiffs may sometimes obtain punitive 
damages in a lawsuit alleging a CPA violation, in addition to statutory or 
treble damages under the statute, by asserting common law causes of 
action.126  When a plaintiff is entitled to both punitive damages in 
conjunction with a common law claim for relief and to treble damages 
under a state statute, it appears that most jurisdictions require the plaintiff 
to elect a remedy to prevent double punishment.127 
As one commentator recognized, “[p]erhaps no other statute . . . 
offers a greater depth or range of recovery than the Consumer Fraud Act. 
. . .  These remedies give the Act sharp teeth and provide an incentive to 
settle, sometimes for considerable money.”128 
C. Availability of Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 
Ordinarily, in civil litigation in the United States, parties are required 
to pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs unless there is an explicit 
statutory provision authorizing an award of fees and costs to the 
prevailing party.  Many little-FTC Acts provide such an authorization.129  
                                                                                                                       
§ 48-608(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1); 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2(a); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-
13.1-5.2(a). 
 125. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1533(A) (2003). 
 126. See, e.g., Wildstein v. Tru Motors, Inc., 547 A.2d 340, 342 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) 
(finding that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does not bar a plaintiff from collecting punitive 
damages for common law fraud in addition to treble damages under the Act). 
 127. Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901, 908 (Tenn. 1999) (“When a plaintiff is 
entitled to both punitive damages in conjunction with a common law claim for relief and to treble 
damages under a statutory scheme, the majority of jurisdictions employ a version of the election of 
remedies doctrine to prevent double recovery of enhanced damages.” (citing Lisa K. Gregory, 
Annotation, Plaintiff’s Rights to Punitive or Multiple Damages When Cause of Action Renders Both 
Available, 2 A.L.R. 5th 449, 459 (1992))).  See, e.g., Lexton-Ancira Real Estate Fund, 1972 v. 
Heller, 826 P.2d 819, 822–23 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (finding that a treble damages award under the 
state’s CPA precluded an award of punitive damages on the same facts); Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 
795 P.2d 1006, 1012 (N.M. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff may not recover both punitive damages 
under a common law cause of action and treble damages under the state’s Unfair Practices Act and 
must elect between the two to prevent double recovery); United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 437 
S.E.2d 374, 379 (N.C. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff may not recover both treble and punitive 
damages based on allegations arising out of the same transaction or practice and requiring the 
plaintiff to elect a remedy after the verdict is rendered and before judgment is entered); see also 
ALA. CODE § 8-19-15(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (requiring plaintiffs to elect to bring a private action 
under the CPA or to bring an action at common law for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, suppression 
of material facts, or fraudulent concealment). 
 128. Keller, supra note 2, at 477. 
 129. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g (West 
Supp. 2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (LexisNexis 2001); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
505/10a(c) (West Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (LexisNexis 1996); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-634(e) (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220(3) (LexisNexis 1996); MD. CODE ANN. 
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In fact, nearly half of the states require an award of reasonable legal fees 
and costs to every prevailing plaintiff.130  These provisions encourage 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring consumer protection lawsuits because no 
matter how small the actual damages, they are, in many cases, 
guaranteed to receive their costs of bringing the lawsuit.  A few states 
take a different approach and explicitly use an award of attorneys’ fees 
and costs to punish a defendant for wrongdoing.131  Several CPAs 
provide a much more limited authorization for a prevailing defendant to 
recover attorneys’ fees—when the lawsuit is found to be frivolous, i.e., it 
is groundless, or brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.132  
The Illinois, Montana, and Oregon CPAs appear to provide prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants with an equal opportunity to request attorneys’ 
                                                                                                                       
COM. LAW § 13-408(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.911(2), (6) (West 
2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(1) (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (2003); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 59-1609 (2004); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 
646.638(3) (2003); 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2(a) (West Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-
109(e)(1) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(5) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 
(West 1999). 
 130. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537(a); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f) (2001); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(b) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-13 (LexisNexis 2002); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(4) (West Supp. 2005); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 41.600(3)(b) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A-10 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 
(West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(c) (LexisNexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 761.1 
(West Supp. 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (1985); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
17.50(d) (Vernon 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(2) (West Supp. 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-12-108(b) (2005); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(d) (2000) (providing for an award of 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs unless the plaintiff rejects a reasonable settlement offer); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213(1-A) (2002) (providing for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and 
costs unless the plaintiff rejected a settlement offer that was more favorable than the judgment).  The 
language of Idaho’s CPA appears to provide for a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees, see IDAHO 
CODE § 48-608(4) (2003), but the Idaho Supreme Court has found prevailing plaintiffs are not 
automatically entitled to fees under the statute.  See Israel v. Leachman, 72 P.3d 864, 867–68 (Idaho 
2003). 
 131. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.45 (West Supp. 2005) (providing for an award of 
attorneys’ fees when the violation was willful); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1(1) (2003) (authorizing an 
award of attorneys’ fees where a defendant commits a willful violation and refuses to fully resolve 
the matter); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-09 (1989) (requiring an award of attorneys’ fees and costs 
where a defendant knowingly commits the violation). 
 132. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(3); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-608(4) (2003); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-634(e)(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408(c); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.45; MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(3) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-
16.1(2) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(F)(1) (LexisNexis 2002); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 17.50(c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(5)(a); see also OKLA STAT. tit. 15, § 761.1(A) 
(authorizing an award of attorneys’ fees and costs not to exceed $10,000 to a prevailing party, when 
the court finds a claim or defense asserted by a nonprevailing party “was asserted in bad faith, was 
not well grounded in fact, or was unwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”); Casey v. Jerry Yusim Nissan, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 
206, 209–10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding that a court may only award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing 
defendant when a plaintiff acted in bad faith). 
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fees from the court.133  With the exception of a few states such as 
Arizona and Delaware,134 most states do not follow in the CPA context 
the traditional “American” rule, which requires that each party pay for its 
own legal expenses. 
D. Availability of Trial by Jury 
Courts vary in their interpretations of CPAs regarding the availability 
of a jury trial,135 though the effect of having a jury or judge decide CPA 
claims is unclear.136  CPAs in a few states, such as Connecticut, Maine, 
Vermont, and Virginia, explicitly provide for trial by jury.137  Most state 
laws do not contain a provision addressing the availability of a jury trial, 
and in those states, some courts have allowed consumer protection 
                                                     
 133. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(c) (“[T]he Court . . . may award . . . reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(3) (“[T]he court 
may award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting or defending the 
action.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(3); see also Dillree v. Devoe, 724 P.2d 171, 176 (Mont. 1986) 
(finding that the defendant was entitled to attorneys’ fees even though the plaintiff prevailed on the 
main controversy where the defendant successfully established that the Montana Consumer 
Protection Act did not apply). 
 134. See Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 521 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Ariz. 1974) 
(“Attorney’s fees may only be awarded where an agreement specifically provides for them or when 
specifically authorized by statute.”); Stephenson v. Capano Dev. Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1078 (Del. 
1983) (“[A]ttorney’s fees are not generally recoverable unless there is a specific statutory 
authorization . . . .”). 
 135. See generally Karen K. Peabody, Annotation, Constitutional Right to Jury Trial in Cause of 
Action Under State Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Law, 54 A.L.R. 5th 631 (2004). 
 136. Given the tendency of media and legal commentators to attribute the trend of skyrocketing 
verdicts to “out-of-control” juries, some may instinctively believe that CPA claims in states not 
providing for a jury trial would have more reasonable outcomes.  This is not necessarily the case.  
For instance, two of Illinois’s largest judgments have been rendered by judges, not juries, and both 
involved cases brought as class action lawsuits under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
Businesses Practices Act, which Illinois courts have interpreted to not permit a jury trial.  See Avery 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (awarding $130 million in 
disgorgement damages and $600 million in punitive damages on Consumer Fraud Act claims in 
addition to $455 million awarded by a jury on the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims), rev’d, 835 
N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005) (finding that non-residents may maintain an action under Illinois’s Consumer 
Fraud Act only if the circumstances relating to the action occur primarily and substantially in 
Illinois, cautioning that plaintiffs may not recast contract claims as CPA claims, and finding that an 
individual claim should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to show actual deception); Price v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Mar. 21, 2003) (awarding a 
class of smokers $7.1 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitive damages in an 
action brought under the Consumer Fraud Act related to light cigarettes, discussed infra notes 228 to 
233 and accompanying text) overruled on other grounds, 793 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), 
vacated, No. 96644, 2003 Ill. LEXIS 2625 (Ill. Sept. 16, 2003).  These cases further illustrate the 
power judges have in interpreting and deciding private lawsuits under CPAs. 
 137. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(g) (West Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 5, § 213(1) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(c) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-206(E) 
(2001). 
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claims to be heard by a jury.138  Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska courts 
have found that claims under their respective states’ CPAs are to be 
decided by a judge, either because the right to a jury trial is not available 
in actions not existing at common law or because the action is primarily 
equitable in nature.139  Georgia, Kentucky, and Massachusetts courts 
have found that there is no right to a jury trial for CPA claims but that a 
jury trial is available at the court’s discretion.140  Connecticut provides 
that while a jury decides liability and compensatory damages, the judge 
decides whether to award punitive damages, costs, attorneys’ fees and 
their amount, as well as whether to grant any injunctive relief.141  Finally, 
in North Carolina, the jury serves as the fact finder and determines 
whether the defendant committed the alleged acts, the extent to which the 
plaintiff was injured, and whether the defendant’s conduct caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.142  Determination of whether a particular act is unfair or 
deceptive, however, is a question of law for the court in North 
Carolina.143 
E. Availability and Restrictions on Class Action Lawsuits 
The ability to bring a class action lawsuit under CPAs also varies 
from state to state, as does the recovery available in such lawsuits.  
Consumer protection statutes in several southern states, as well as 
                                                     
 138. See, e.g., Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 745 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (interpreting District of Columbia law); Chicken Unlimited, Inc. v. Bockover, 374 So. 2d 96, 
96–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356, 363–64 (Idaho 2004); Boncosky 
Servs., Inc. v. Lampo, 751 So. 2d 278, 284 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Peterson v. Boat Sales, Inc., No. 
248733, 2004 WL 2952608, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2004); Cohen v. Express Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 145 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); U.W. Marx, Inc. v. Bonded Concrete, Inc., 776 
N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Reichert v. Ingersoll, 480 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ohio 1985); 
Valley Nissan, Inc. v. Davila, 133 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App. 2003); Horan v. Tpk. Ford, 433 
S.E.2d 559, 563 (W. Va. 1993). 
 139. See Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734, 754–55 (Ill. 1994) (finding that 
“an action under the Consumer Fraud Act [is] a new statutory right created by the legislature and, as 
such, does not confer the right to a jury trial” and finding that the legislature intended that such 
actions be tried without a jury); State v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992) (finding that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s request for a jury trial because 
claims under the state’s CPA are equitable in nature), aff’d, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993); State ex 
rel. Douglas v. Schroeder, 384 N.W.2d 626, 629–30 (Neb. 1986) (finding that because the CPA 
“seeks to prevent prejudicial conduct rather than merely compensate such damage as may flow 
therefrom” there is no right to a jury trial). 
 140. Regency Nissan, Inc. v. Taylor, 391 S.E.2d 467, 470–71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Stevens v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 759 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Ky. 1988); Travis v. McDonald, 490 N.E.2d 1169, 
1172–73 (Mass. 1986). 
 141. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(g). 
 142. Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681 (N.C. 2000). 
 143. Id. 
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Montana, explicitly prohibit class actions.144  On the other hand, the laws 
of at least fourteen states and the District of Columbia expressly permit 
class action lawsuits.145  The little-FTC Acts in just more than half of the 
states are silent on whether class action relief is available under the 
statute: they neither specifically authorize nor preclude class action 
relief.  In such cases, courts have often found class action relief 
available.146  A business can face both a class action lawsuit and a state 
Attorney General action arising out of the same conduct.147 
A few states that allow for class action litigation under their CPAs 
place limits on claims or recovery in such suits.  For example, Colorado, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah laws provide that class members 
may not receive more than actual damages in a class action lawsuit; they 
are not entitled to the minimum amount per violation or treble damages 
otherwise provided by statute.148  Similarly, New Mexico limits receipt 
of treble damages to class representatives while allowing class members 
to recover only actual damages.149  Utah’s unique law permits class 
actions only where a defendant would have had notice that its conduct 
constituted a violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act.150  Class 
actions are only permitted where the claim is premised on (1) a violation 
of a rule promulgated by the state agency regulating consumer 
                                                     
 144. ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(f) (LexisNexis 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (2000); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(4) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 30.14-133(1) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(1), (3) (2002). 
 145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k) (LexisNexis 2001); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480-13(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-608(1) 
(2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (LexisNexis 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(b)–(d) 
(1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(2) (West Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
445.911(3) (West 2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(2)–(3) (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
358-A:10-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(E) (LexisNexis 2000); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (LexisNexis 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(b) (2001); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(3) (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (2005). 
 146. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 247–48 (D. Del. 2002); 
London v. Green Acres Trust, 765 P.2d 538, 545 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Waugh v. Philpot, 868 So. 
2d 699, 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 676 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Neb. 2004); 
Super Glue Corp. v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 517 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); 
Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 54 P.3d 665, 675 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); cf. Chaffin v. Norwegian 
Cruise Line Ltd., No. 02A01-9803-CH-00080, 1999 WL 188295, at *2 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 
1999) (“Interestingly, [the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act] authorizes persons to ‘bring an 
action individually,’ yet Plaintiffs assert this action both individually and as representatives on 
behalf of a class.  Though we are unaware of any prior Tennessee case addressing this issue, this 
issue is not presently before this Court, and we therefore express no judgment or opinion regarding 
it.”). 
 147. See, e.g., London, 765 P.2d at 545. 
 148. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2) (2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 1976); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(E); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2); OR. R. CIV. P. 32(K). 
 149. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(E). 
 150. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(4)(a). 
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transactions, (2) conduct declared a violation of the act by the final 
judgment of a court made available for public dissemination by the 
agency, or (3) a violation of a consent judgment by the defendant.151 
F. Statutes of Limitations 
Like other elements of CPAs, the time period for bringing a lawsuit 
and the trigger for when this period begins to run varies from state to 
state.  Statutes of limitations range from one year152 to six years.153  Most 
states have adopted something in between.154  In addition, some states 
apply a “discovery rule,” under which the statute of limitations begins to 
run when a violation or injury resulting from a violation is or should 
have been discovered.155  Other state laws have adopted an occurrence-
based statute that sets a fixed time period in which to bring lawsuits from 
the date of the transaction at issue.156  At least three states, Alabama, 
                                                     
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(E) (2003) (requiring actions to be brought within 
one year of the transaction); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(6) (2003) (requiring actions to be brought 
within one year of discovery of the unlawful act); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-109 (2005) (requiring 
action to be brought within one year of initial discovery of the unlawful practice); Teran v. Citicorp 
Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., 706 P.2d 382, 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring private lawsuits to be 
brought within one year of when fraud was discovered or could have been discovered). 
 153. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(7) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
541.05(2) (West Supp. 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16(2) (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 511 
(2002); State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362, 364 (Me. 1987) (finding that a consumer 
may bring an action within six years of reasonable notice of the action); Gabriel v. O’Hara, 534 A.2d 
488, 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that claims under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law fall within the ambit of the six-year “catchall” limitations period). 
 154. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(f) (West Supp. 2005) (three years after the 
violation); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (three years); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
48-619 (2003) (two years after the cause of action accrues); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 5A 
(West 2004) (four years after the cause of action accrues); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1612 (2004) (four 
years after the cause of action accrues); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.10(C) (LexisNexis 2002) 
(two years from the actual violation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-150 (1985) (three years after 
discovery of the unlawful conduct); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-33 (2004) (two years after 
occurrence or discovery of the conduct); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(8) (two years after the 
occurrence or one year after termination of government proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204.1 
(2001) (two years after accrual of the action); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(3) (West 2004) 
(three years after occurrence of the unlawful act). 
 155. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(f) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-115 (2004); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 11.190(3)(d) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:3(IV-a) (LexisNexis 2004); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 646.638(6); Tiberi v. Cigna Corp., 89 F.3d 1423, 1430 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that 
the statute of limitations under New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act is four years after the plaintiff 
discovered or should have discovered the violation); Univ. of Vt. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 565 A.2d 
1354, 1357 (Vt. 1989) (interpreting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 511 as requiring actions to be brought 
within six years of discovery of the injury). 
 156. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1783 (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(f) 
(West Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-5(b) (LexisNexis 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
367.220(5) (LexisNexis 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(E); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
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Tennessee, and Texas, combine a discovery rule with an absolute limit 
on the bringing of lawsuits under their consumer protection laws.157 
G. Miscellaneous Limitations and Exemptions 
CPAs have some common exceptions.  Maryland is one of several 
states excluding providers of professional services, such as certified 
public accountants, lawyers, and health care providers, from its CPA.158 
Michigan courts have developed a similar “learned professions” 
exception.159  Most state laws defer to the expertise of state and federal 
government agencies by exempting regulated conduct from the CPA, 
particularly when the conduct is explicitly authorized by law.160  Some 
                                                                                                                       
445.911(7); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.10(C); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(8); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(3); Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 377 F.3d 917, 926 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05(1)(2)); Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 750 N.E.2d 1078, 1083–84 
(N.Y. 2001) (interpreting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 2003)). 
 157. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-14 (LexisNexis 2002) (providing that a claim must be filed within 
one year of when the plaintiff discovers or should have reasonably discovered the act or practice, but 
not more than four years after the date of the transaction); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-110 (Supp. 
2004) (providing that a claim must be filed within one year of discovery of the unlawful practice, but 
not more than five years of the date of the transaction); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 
(Vernon 2002) (providing that a claim must be filed within two years of occurrence or within two 
years of when the consumer discovered or reasonably could have discovered the occurrence of the 
violation). 
 158. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-104(1) (LexisNexis 2004). 
 159. See Nelson v. Ho, 564 N.W.2d 482, 486–87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the 
professional activities of physicians are not included in the meaning of trade or commerce and that 
physicians may only be sued under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act for entrepreneurial 
activities). 
 160. About two-thirds of CPAs specifically exempt acts or transactions regulated by, authorized 
by, or in compliance with rules or regulations of a federal or state government agency.  See ALASKA 
STAT. § 45.50.481(a) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1523 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-
101(1) (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-106(1) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110c(a); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(b) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.212 (West 2005); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 
10-1-374, -396 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481A-5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 48-605 (2003); 815 ILL. COMP.  STAT. ANN. 505/10b(1) (West. Supp. 2005); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 24-5-0.5-6 (LexisNexis 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16(14) (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §367.176(2) (LexisNexis 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1406 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 208 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 3 (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 445.904 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.46 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
59-1617, 87-304 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.0955 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-
12-7 (West 2000); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350-d (McKinney 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1345.12 (LexisNexis 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 754 (West Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 
646.612 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-4 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40 (1985); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-10 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-111(a) (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 17.49(b) (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-22(1)(a), (e) (2001); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 59.1-199 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.170 (West 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
40-12-110(a) (2005).  These exemptions may rise in importance, particularly in private consumer 
protection litigation involving highly regulated industries, following the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
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state courts, such as those in Colorado, Nebraska, and Washington, 
require that private actions under CPA acts be brought “in the public 
interest” and not just to redress a private wrong.161  The public interest 
restriction reflects the goal of the creation of private rights of action, 
namely “to insure more effective enforcement within the context of the 
marketplace” by “protect[ing] the public from a generalized course of 
conduct without over-regulation of the state’s businesses.”162 
IV. THE EXPANDED AND ABUSIVE USE OF PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 
UNDER STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES 
In the first ten to twenty years of their adoption, the private remedy 
provisions of CPAs were used only sporadically by consumers.163  Even 
then, scholars predicted that the power of these provisions had been 
“severely underestimated.”164  In recent years, both the use and abuse of 
these statutes have resulted in increased scrutiny and criticism from 
scholars and commentators.165 
The private right of action included in state CPAs did not, in many 
cases, come with the procedural and proof protections required in 
ordinary common law fraud actions.  For example, many CPAs do not 
require a showing of actual reliance on the alleged misrepresentation or 
omission.  In addition, cases alleging fraudulent conduct under consumer 
protection statutes do not need to be pled with particularity as required in 
common law actions.166  This has allowed plaintiffs to bring broad claims 
                                                                                                                       
decision in Price v. Philip Morris, No. 96326, 2005 WL 3434368 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 2005), 
discussed infra notes 252–58 and accompanying text. 
 161. See, e.g., Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 234 (Colo. 1998) (en banc); Martinez v. Lewis, 969 
P.2d 213, 222 (Colo. 1998) (en banc); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 142 
(Neb. 2000); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 535 
(Wash. 1986) (en banc); see also Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland 
Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that New York’s Deceptive Business Acts 
and Practices law does not apply to “private contract disputes, unique to the parties”). 
 162. David J. Dove, Washington Consumer Protection Act—Public Interest and the Private 
Litigant, 60 WASH. L. REV. 201, 202 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). 
 163. Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive 
Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 521, 522 (1980). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Keller, supra note 2, at 474 (“In cases unnoticed by many of us, the appellate courts 
have been shaping the Act into a powerful weapon.”); see generally Keith E. Andrews, Louisiana 
Unfair Trade Practices Act: Broad Language and Generous Remedies Supplemented by a Confusing 
Body of Case Law, 41 LOY. L. REV. 759 (1996). 
 166. See, e.g., Snierson v. Scruton, 761 A.2d 1046, 1049 (N.H. 2000) (“A plaintiff cannot allege 
fraud in general terms, but must specifically allege the essential details of the fraud and the facts of 
the defendants’ fraudulent conduct.”). 
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immediately and then seek evidence to support their allegations later.  
The scope of remedies provided by state CPAs also differs significantly 
from that of the federal law.  Rather than provide for a cease-and-desist 
order and other injunctive and remedial relief that would help the public, 
some of these state laws have the potential for substantial damages when 
a business is found to have run afoul of a highly ambiguous law.  Finally, 
three out of four states allow for class action lawsuits under their CPAs, 
providing the potential for extraordinary damage awards and a strong 
incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring nominal claims on behalf of 
thousands of people for inadvertent or technical violations of the law. 
CPAs have blossomed into a powerful tool for plaintiffs’ lawyers.  
Their broad wording allows lawyers to use them as a catchall statutory 
cause of action, with the potential for substantial damages and an award 
of attorneys’ fees.  Although Congress passed the 1938 FTC Act to 
provide a means for the federal government to regulate deceptive 
advertising and coercive sales methods, state little-FTC Acts are now 
invoked to attack a broad range of issues.  Some of these “fringe” cases 
include insurance and banking practices, sales of securities, commercial 
transactions, residential rental situations, and even personal injury 
claims.167 
Moreover, the relaxation of the need to show proof of actual, 
reasonable reliance and damages has made it easier to bring class action 
lawsuits.  Thus, some courts have found that plaintiffs need only show a 
causal link between the alleged deceptive conduct and an injury to satisfy 
class certification standards under CPAs.168  These already minimal 
requirements are further diminished in class action lawsuits, where some 
courts have “presumed” elements such as causation when the plaintiffs 
have otherwise established a violation under the act.169  In addition, 
courts have allowed multi-state or nationwide class actions that involve 
application of multiple state CPAs.170  As this Article shows, given the 
numerous differences among state laws and the need to show individual 
 
                                                     
 167. See Franke & Ballam, supra note 68, at 360, 361–62 n.90, 423 (examining the expansive 
use of CPAs in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas and arguing in support of a broad reading and application of CPAs by courts). 
 168. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 248 (D. Del. 2002) 
(stating that “[w]hether and to what extent the conduct of a defendant caused injury to plaintiffs and 
the class” is a question of fact). 
 169. See, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 807, 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2000) (stating that a “defendant who violates the art” is liable regardless of whether a person 
has been injured). 
 170. E.g., Warfarin Sodium, 212 F.R.D. at 248 n.15. 
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reliance or damages, it is particularly inappropriate to certify national 
class actions in such cases. 
A. Case Study: California’s Section 17200 
Until recently, California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL)171 was 
arguably the broadest consumer fraud statute in the nation.172  Originally, 
the UCL provided a statutory cause of action for traditional business 
torts.173  In 1933, California rewrote the UCL to provide injunctive relief 
for unfair competition, which was defined to include fraudulent business 
practices and deceptive advertising.174  In addition, the rewritten UCL 
allowed any member of the public to bring suit.175  In the 1970s, the 
California General Assembly further amended the law to allow plaintiffs 
to seek restitution and moved the law to begin at Section 17200 of the 
California Business and Professional Code.176  The California Supreme 
Court further expanded the scope of the law in 1988 when it ruled that a 
plaintiff did not need to be injured to bring an action under Section 
17200,177 and in 1992 the General Assembly amended the law to allow 
private lawsuits stemming from out-of-state activities.178 
The gradual and consistent loosening of the UCL allowed plaintiffs 
to file “Section 17200” or “private attorney general” actions without 
meeting the basic standing rules that California law normally required.  
Rather, the UCL allowed almost any individual to bring an action on 
behalf of him or herself, a representative class, or the general public.179  
                                                     
 171. The law is codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 1997 & Supp. 
2005).  The UCL recently was amended by Proposition 64.  See infra notes 199–201 and 
accompanying text. 
 172. See Robert C. Fellmeth, California’s Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and 
Confusions, in 26 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS 227, 239–49 (1995) 
(comparing California’s UCL to sixteen other states and concluding that it is the broadest).  
California has also adopted a less frequently used “Consumer Legal Remedies Act,” which broadly 
prohibits “unfair and deceptive business practices” and provides consumers with a private right of 
action to obtain actual damages but not less than $1000 in a class action, injunctive relief, restitution, 
punitive damages, and any other relief that the court deems proper.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1784 
(West 1997 & Supp. 2005). 
 173. Fellmeth, supra note 172, at 231. 
 174. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 727 (Cal. 2000) (discussing the 1933 
amendments). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. People v. Cappuccio, Inc., 251 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 178. Stop Youth Smoking Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097 (Cal. 
1998). 
 179. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005).  The UCL was recently 
amended by Proposition 64.  See infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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The law did not require a plaintiff to show that he or she or anyone else 
had suffered any harm.180  Although plaintiffs were permitted to bring 
claims under Section 17200 as class actions,181 a plaintiff could avoid 
satisfying the procedural safeguards normally required in California class 
actions—adequacy, commonality, numerously, and superiority182—by 
merely bringing a claim as a representative under the statute, which did 
not require these safeguards.  “Defendants did not necessarily receive the 
protections that are available in class actions, including finality and 
protection against more than one lawsuit arising from essentially the 
same allegations.”183 
Section 17200 allowed (and continues to allow) plaintiffs to bring 
claims for fraudulent conduct and unfair acts.  Fraudulent conduct is 
conduct that is “likely to deceive” members of the public.184  Unlike 
plaintiffs who bring common law fraud and misrepresentation claims, 
plaintiffs who brought Section 17200 actions prior to 2004 did not need 
to show actual deception, reasonable reliance, or damages.185 
It is unclear what constitutes an “unfair” act.  The California 
Supreme Court has rejected two different appellate court attempts to 
define the term because the attempts were “too amorphous and provided 
little guidance.”186  However, two California appellate courts have found 
that unfair practices include violations of public policy as demonstrated 
by statutory or regulatory prohibitions.187  Thus, under Section 17200, an 
unfair business practice may include any practice that violates another 
law.  California courts have interpreted the statute as allowing a private 
cause of action for virtually any violation of a state or federal law or 
regulation.188  In fact, the California Supreme Court found that an 
                                                     
 180. See Stop Youth Smoking, 950 P.2d at 1097 (stating that a private individual can seek 
injunctive relief). 
 181. Corbett v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 182. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 382, 384 (West 2004). 
 183. Alexander S. Gareeb, Evaluating the Retroactive Application of Proposition 64, 28 L.A. 
LAW., Mar., 2005, at 10. 
 184. Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 185. Comm’n on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668–69 (Cal. 
1983). 
 186. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 543 (Cal. 1999) 
(rejecting a determination of unfairness based on a weighing of the defendant’s conduct against the 
gravity of harm to the alleged victim or a determination that the act offends an established public 
policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers). 
 187. See Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 115–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); 
Gregory v. Albertsons, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 188. See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992).  Courts in 
other states have found that CPA claims may not be alleged to effectively establish a private right of 
action for a violation of a statute where the legislature did not provide for such a remedy.  See, e.g., 
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individual could bring a lawsuit under Section 17200 as a violation of a 
predicate statute, even if that law did not allow for a private right of 
action.189 
Section 17200 continues to provide courts with broad equitable 
power to make such orders and judgments as necessary to prevent future 
unfair acts and to restore any person in the amount acquired by the unfair 
act.190  The statute does not provide for money damages beyond 
restitution.  Yet, a court may order restitution even to those who were 
never influenced by the deceptive act “if the court determines that such a 
remedy is necessary to deter future violations . . . or to foreclose the 
defendant’s retention of ill-gotten gains.”191 
The loosened rules for standing and the broad scope of Section 
17200 actions led to substantial abuse involving small and large 
businesses alike.192  For example, plaintiffs used Section 17200 suits to 
attack auto dealers and homebuilders for technical violations such as 
using the wrong font size or an abbreviation, such as “APR,” instead of 
“Annual Percentage Rate.”193  They went after hardware stores for 
advertising locks as “Made in the U.S.A.,” when the locks included six 
screws made in Taiwan.194  They sued nail salons that used the same nail 
polish bottle for more than one customer.195  And one Section 17200 suit 
involved a restaurant in which the bathroom mirror was an inch too high 
                                                                                                                       
Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 241 F.3d 242, 258 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that where New York law only 
provided that the Attorney General or a District Attorney could commence an action for violation of 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, “[p]laintiffs cannot circumvent this result by claiming that a 
violation is actionable as [a deceptive practices claim]” because it is contrary to legislative intent and 
at odds with the statutory scheme). 
 189. Stop Youth Smoking Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Cal. 
1998) (“[I]t is in enacting the UCL itself, and not by virtue of particular predicate statutes, that the 
Legislature has conferred upon private plaintiffs ‘specific power’ to prosecute unfair competition 
claims.”). 
 190. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 2004).  See also Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration 
Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 717 (Cal. 2000) (recognizing the trial court’s “very broad” discretion in 
awarding equitable relief). 
 191. Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 59 (Cal. 1979). 
 192. See, e.g., George Avalos, Prop. 64 Draws Strong Arguments, State Measure Would Limit 
Right to Sue; Backers and Foes Both Predict Calamity If They Lose, CONTA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2004, at 4; David Reyes, Business Owners Rally Around Initiative to Limit Lawsuits; Proposition 64 
Aimed at ‘Shakedowns,’ Would Weaken Unfair Competition Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, at B3; 
Robert Rodriguez, Business Coalition Seeks to Tighten Law, Lawyers Use Loophole to Sue, Group 
Says, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 6, 2004, at C1. 
 193. John Wildermuth, Measure Would Limit Public Interest Suits, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 2004, 
at B1. 
 194. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 195. Amanda Bronstad, Brar & Gamulin Nail Salons Sued Under Unfair Competition Law, L.A. 
BUS. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at 12. 
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for it to meet disability requirements.196  Plaintiffs sued AOL Time 
Warner, Disney, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer for using movie reviews 
from critics who received perks for their reviews.197  Nike faced a suit 
when it attempted to defend itself against allegations that it mistreated 
and underpaid workers in production facilities in Asia brought by a 
California resident who alleged “no harm or damages whatsoever 
regarding himself individually.”198 
On November 2, 2004, public outrage over Section 17200 lawsuits 
led California voters to overwhelmingly pass Proposition 64, which 
limited the potential for abuse of Section 17200.199  Individuals who have 
suffered neither a monetary nor a proprietary injury can no longer bring 
an action under the UCL.200  In addition, a private individual who brings 
a representative action on behalf of others must have suffered an injury 
and must comply with the requirements for class action lawsuits in 
California.201  Proposition 64’s reforms address the most egregious 
abuses of Section 17200—frivolous lawsuits by uninjured parties and 
actions brought by individuals on behalf of others without class action 
safeguards. 
B. Stretching the Law Past its Limits to Attack Deep-Pocket and 
Unpopular Defendants 
Consumer protection statutes are increasingly used to assert novel, 
private causes of action against perceived deep-pocket companies and 
unpopular industries where liability would not ordinarily exist under 
common law.  These lawsuits seek to tempt courts into stretching CPAs 
to regulate entire industries where legislators or regulators have not acted 
 
                                                     
 196. Rodriguez, supra note 192. 
 197. John H. Sullivan, California’s All-Purpose Plaintiffs’ Law Continues to Reach Out, Touch 
Everyone, 10 METRO. CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2002, at 52.  In one instance, a Beverly Hills law firm 
filed more than 2200 claims against restaurants and auto repair shops on behalf of a dummy 
corporation located at the law firm’s address.  Monte Morin, State Accuses Law Firm of Extortion, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at 5.  The claims were based on minor violations of the state’s 
Automotive Repair Act.  The law firm sent the defendants settlement offers that demanded payments 
ranging from $6000 to $26,000.  Id.  In early 2003, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed a 
Section 17200 lawsuit on behalf of the state against the law firm involved for abusing Section 
17200.  Id.  Ultimately, the lawyers from the law firm surrendered their law licenses. 
 198. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003). 
 199. Gareeb, supra note 183. 
 200. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2004) (as amended by Proposition 64). 
 201. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 2004) (as amended by Proposition 64). 
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and to provide large damage awards without a showing of an actual 
injury or causation.202 
1. McLawsuits 
Consumer protection laws have provided the tool by which 
plaintiffs’ lawyers have attacked the fast food industry for America’s 
overeating.203  This occurred in Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s 
                                                     
 202. Altering fundamental tort law to attack an unpopular industry can have extraordinary, 
unforeseen consequences.  For example, in the 1982 product liability case of Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that an asbestos manufacturer could 
be held liable even if it did not know or could not have known of a risk caused by its product.  447 
A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982).  See also Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113–
14 (La. 1986) (same).  Some commentators attribute rulings of this type, which strip defendants of 
available defenses, to a quest by courts to expedite asbestos litigation because of the surge in 
asbestos lawsuits.  See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation’s Trial Judges: 
How the Focus on Efficiency Is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247, 264–67 (2000).  The New Jersey Supreme Court later limited the damage 
of its ruling by restricting Beshada’s holding to its facts, see Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 
374, 388 (N.J. 1984), and both the New Jersey and Louisiana rulings were later overruled by 
legislation, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1) (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-3(3) (1987). 
 203. Recently, the dairy industry has also faced attack under CPAs.  In June 2005, the Physicians 
Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) filed two lawsuits, a class action seeking injunctive 
relief and an individual action for damages under Virginia’s Consumer Protection Act, against the 
International Dairy Foods Association, National Dairy Council, and several individual companies.  
See Complaint, Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., Ch. No. 05-00-2179 
(Va. Cir. Ct., City of Alexandria, filed June 28, 2005); Complaint, Physicians Comm. for 
Responsible Med. v. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, At Law No. 05-0013-20 (Va. Cir. Ct., City of 
Alexandria, filed June 28, 2005).  The complaints allege the defendants falsely advertised milk 
products as helpful in promoting weight loss.  Kraft Foods at 1, Ch. No. 05-00-2179; Int’l Dairy at 
1, At Law No. 05-0013-20.  The dairy industry has disputed PCRM’s claims, stating that “PCRM is 
an anti-meat, anti-dairy group whose campaigns and views are closely aligned with the animal rights 
group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).”  Press Release, National Dairy 
Council, Extensive Body of Science Backs Dairy/Weight-Loss Link; Animal Rights Group Once 
Again Tries to Distort the Facts, http://www.nationaldairycouncil.org/NationalDairyCouncil/Press/ 
Alert/Alert2005/PCRMstatement62705DairyWeightLoss.htm. (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).  The 
industry’s release also states that physicians make up only five percent of PCRM’s membership and 
notes that PCRM’s views in the past have been denounced by the American Medical Association 
and other reputable organizations.  Id.  “When it comes to nutrition, people should listen to health 
and nutrition professionals, not an animal rights group.”  Id.  PCRM has also filed a class action 
lawsuit against supermarket chains and dairy companies under the District of Columbia’s CPA on 
behalf of all District residents who are or may become lactose intolerant for allegedly failing to warn 
consumers about the effects of lactose.  See Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint, Mills v. Giant of 
Maryland, Civ. Action No. 05-0008054, at 1–4 (D.C. Sup. Ct., filed Oct 6, 2005) (on file with 
author).  The lactose lawsuit seeks monetary compensation for named plaintiffs and a court order 
prohibiting the defendants from selling milk in the District until packaging provides a specified 
warning label about lactose intolerance.  See id. at 15–17; see also Marguerite Higgins, Lawsuit 
Targets Dairy Industry, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at C8 (reporting that the group plans to file 
additional lawsuits regarding other dairy products, such as cheese and yogurt, depending on the 
success of the milk claim). 
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Corp.,204 a case by two minors through their parents against the burger 
giant under the New York Consumer Protection Act (NYCPA), which 
prohibits deceptive acts or practices and false advertising.205  The lawsuit 
was brought as a class action on behalf of all minors living in New York 
state who had purchased and consumed McDonald’s products.206  The 
plaintiffs alleged that McDonald’s led them to believe its products were 
“healthy and wholesome” and to purchase McDonald’s products in a 
manner they otherwise would not have.207  The plaintiffs claimed their 
consumption of McDonald’s products led to an increased likelihood of a 
plethora of adverse health effects, ranging from obesity to high blood 
pressure, heart disease, and cancer.208 
Federal District Court Judge Robert Sweet wrote two lengthy 
opinions dismissing the lawsuit.209  In his first ruling, Judge Sweet 
recognized that traditional showings of reliance and scienter were not 
required under the NYCPA but that the deceptive practice must be 
objectively misleading to the reasonable consumer.210  He nevertheless 
initially dismissed the claims because the plaintiffs did not identify a 
single instance of McDonald’s committing a deceptive act and because it 
was not unlawful to encourage consumers to purchase a product.211  
Judge Sweet also found that the plaintiffs had “shunned” their duty to 
show why the failure of McDonald’s to label its food with nutritional 
information, an obligation not required by state or federal regulations, 
was deceptive.212 
After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to cure the deficiencies 
identified in the court’s dismissal of the case, Judge Sweet again 
                                                     
 204. 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated in part and remanded, 396 F.3d 508 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
 205. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349–50 (McKinney 2004). 
 206. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
 207. Pelman, 396 F.3d at 510.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that McDonald’s violated 
Sections 349 and 350 because (1) “the combined effect of McDonald’s various promotional 
representations . . . was to create the false impression that its food products were nutritionally 
beneficial and part of a healthy lifestyle if consumed daily;” (2) “McDonald’s failed adequately to 
disclose that its use of certain additives and the manner of its food processing rendered certain of its 
foods substantially less healthy than represented;” and (3) “McDonald’s deceptively represented that 
it would provide nutritional information to its New York customers when in reality such information 
was not readily available.”  Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 512; Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 02 
Civ. 7821(RWS), 2003 WL 22052778 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003), vacated in part, 396 F.3d at 508. 
 210. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
 211. See id. at 527–28 (“Merely encouraging consumers to eat its products ‘everyday’ is mere 
puffery, at most, in the absence of a claim that to do so will result in a specific effect on health.”). 
 212. Id. at 529. 
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dismissed the complaint, this time without leave to amend.213  First, the 
court addressed the lack of any showing of reliance—as the plaintiffs did 
not claim they had ever seen or heard a McDonald’s advertisement.214  
The court found that NYCPA did not require a showing of reliance when 
claiming a deceptive act but that reliance was required in a claim for 
false advertising.215  Finding that the plaintiffs were “not entitled to a 
presumption of reliance”216 and that the plaintiffs’ vague allegations of 
reliance on unspecified advertisements were insufficient, the court 
dismissed the false advertising claims.217  The court then dismissed the 
deceptive practices claim because of the lack of any showing of 
causation between the McDonald’s food consumed and the alleged 
injuries.218  “Plaintiffs have failed . . . to draw an adequate causal 
connection between their consumption of McDonald’s food and their 
alleged injuries,” the court found, given their consumption of other types 
of food and other behaviors, beyond diet, that could factor into the 
plaintiffs’ obesity and other health problems.219  In addition, the court 
found that the plaintiffs had not shown that an objectively reasonable 
consumer would have been misled by the defendant’s assertions with 
respect to the preparation and content of french fries and hash browns.220 
In January 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling.221  While the district court’s 
dismissal of the deceptive advertising claim (which required a showing 
of reliance) went unchallenged, the appellate court reinstated the 
deceptive practices claim.222  The court found that a claim under the 
consumer protection statute “need only meet the bare-bones notice-
pleading requirements” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that 
it did not need to be pled with particularity, as in common law fraud 
actions.223  For this reason, the Second Circuit found that causation issues 
were appropriate for discovery and that the plaintiffs’ claims should not 
have been dismissed prior to such an opportunity.224 
                                                     
 213. Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *14. 
 214. Id. at *7. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at *8–*9. 
 218. Id. at *9. 
 219. Id. at *11. 
 220. Id. at *12–*13. 
 221. Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 222. Id. at 511–12. 
 223. Id. at 511. 
 224. Id. at 512. 
SCHWARTZ FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:54:23 AM 
2005] COMMON-SENSE CONSTRUCTION 41 
Pelman provides a vivid illustration of the importance of requiring 
actual reliance and causation in consumer protection claims.  The 
alternative is to permit plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring class action lawsuits 
claiming (1) information either should or should not have been provided 
to consumers; (2) even though those allegedly injured never saw or heard 
or relied upon the information; and (3) where the tie between the 
advertisement or practice and the injury is obviously lacking.  While this 
case may ultimately be dismissed a third time, the Second Circuit’s 
decision permits the plaintiffs to engage in a fishing expedition in which 
McDonald’s will go through lengthy and costly discovery.  The company 
will have increased pressure to settle, regardless of the legal merits, 
particularly if the court later certifies the class.  Finally, Pelman presents 
an example of how consumer protection statutes can be used to impose 
“regulation through litigation,” by which some plaintiffs’ lawyers 
attempt to regulate entire industries in ways not contemplated by those 
empowered to do so—legislatures and regulatory agencies.225 
2. “Lights” Lawsuits 
After receiving billions in attorneys’ fees as a result of the multi-state 
settlement of lawsuits aimed at forcing the industry to pay for smoking-
related health costs incurred through Medicaid,226 the legal industry built 
around such suits needed a new way to attack the unpopular tobacco 
companies.  Class action lawsuits asserting claims under consumer 
protection statutes provided this new tool.  The latest innovation, so-
called “lights cases,” generally involve allegations that cigarette 
manufacturers violated CPAs by misleading smokers into believing light 
cigarettes were safer and less harmful than regular cigarettes.227  The first 
                                                     
 225. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Regulation Through Litigation Has Just 
Begun: What You Can Do To Stop It, BRIEFLY, Nov. 1999, vol. 3, No. 11, available at 
http://www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/Vol3Num11Nov1999.pdf (stating that some judges and lawyers 
attempt to usurp the power of elected representatives).  Twenty states have reacted by enacting 
legislation prohibiting lawsuits against food manufacturers and sellers arising out of weight gain, 
obesity, a health condition associated with weight gain or obesity, or other generally known 
conditions allegedly caused by or allegedly likely to result from long-term consumption of food.  See 
Melanie Warner, The Food Industry Empire Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at C1 (citing the 
victories of fast food companies in avoiding law suits); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Phil S. 
Goldberg, Closing the Food Court: Why Legislative Action is Needed to Curb Obesity Lawsuits, 
BRIEFLY, Aug. 2004, vol. 8, No. 8, available at http://www.nlcpi.orgbooks/pdf/BRIEFLY_Aug04. 
pdf (discussing an overview of litigation against food companies). 
 226. See Elaine McArdle, Trial Lawyers, AGs Creating a New Branch of Government, LAW. 
WKLY. USA, July 12, 1999, at B3 (discussing the rise of industry-wide lawsuits). 
 227. Light cigarettes include ventilation holes near the cigarette’s filter, which reduce the 
delivery of tar and nicotine.  In claims under CPAs, plaintiffs allege that when consumers smoke the 
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of these suits was filed in 1998, not coincidently the same year the 
tobacco industry agreed to the landmark $246-billion settlement with 
state attorneys general in the Medicaid recoupment suits.  Several courts 
have heard cases alleging identical facts and have come to very different 
conclusions, illustrating the clear choice that judges have in interpreting 
CPAs.228 
Tobacco companies argue that class certification is improper and that 
liability in these cases is unsupported because consumers purchase the 
product for different reasons, use it in different ways, and cannot show 
actual financial loss.  They note that a substantial number of smokers 
purchase light cigarettes for their taste, rather than for any perceived 
health benefit.229  In addition, depending on the manner in which the 
cigarette is smoked, some consumers receive lower tar and nicotine than 
they would when smoking regular cigarettes.230  The companies argue 
that because the cost of light cigarettes is no higher than regular 
cigarettes, the plaintiffs “lost” nothing.231 
In the August 2004 ruling in Aspinall v. Philip Morris Co., a sharply 
divided Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (the highest court in 
the Commonwealth) affirmed a trial court order certifying a class 
consisting of all purchasers of Marlboro Lights in Massachusetts.232  
                                                                                                                       
cigarettes they often cover the ventilation holes with their lips or fingers or increase the frequency 
and volume of puffs to compensate for lower nicotine levels, which diminishes or eliminates any 
health benefit.  The plaintiffs seek damages for the economic injury of purchasing a product that 
differs from what tobacco companies represent it to be.  See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hines, 
883 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Aspinall v. Philip Morris, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 480–
81 (Mass. 2004). 
 228. As of the time of this writing, “lights” cases are certified as class actions only in Missouri 
and Ohio.  See Collora v. R.J. Reynolds Co., No. 002-00732, 2003 WL 23139377 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Dec 
31, 2003); Craft v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 002-00406A, 2003 WL 23139381 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Dec 31, 
2003); Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 03CA0120-M, 2004 WL 2050485 (Ohio Ct. App., 
Sep 15, 2004) (affirming the trial court’s certification of an Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act 
claim and denial of certification of fraud claims seeking compensation for personal injuries), appeal 
allowed, 821 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio 2005).  The Missouri and Ohio cases are on appeal..  On the other 
hand, several courts have refused to certify “lights” cases.  In January 2005, a Minnesota court 
denied class certification in a lights case after finding that individual issues predominated.  See 
SHOOK, HARDY, & BACON L.L.P., THE TREND REJECTING CERTIFICATION OF TOBACCO CLASS 
ACTIONS 46 (2004) (citing Curtis v. Philip Morris Cos., No. PI 01-018042, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct., 
Hennepin County, Jan. 16, 2004)).  In March 2005, a California court decertified a lights class action 
after finding that the November 2004 referendum of California’s Section 17200, discussed above, 
negated class action status.  Brown v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. JCCP 4042, 2005 WL 579720 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Mar. 7, 2005). 
 229. See, e.g., arguments raised in cases cited supra note 228. 
 230. See, e.g., Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d at 486 (citing plaintiff’s admission that some people 
received lower tar and nicotine). 
 231. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hines, 883 So. 2d 292, 293–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004) (stating smokers received what they paid for); Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d at 486 (same). 
 232. 813 N.E.2d at 492. 
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Finding class certification proper, the four-member majority rejected the 
defendant’s argument that each member of the class must prove the 
allegedly deceptive advertising caused actual harm.233  Rather, the 
majority found that a practice was deceptive—thus, actionable under 
Massachusetts’s CPA as a class action—if it was capable of misleading a 
reasonable consumer.234  “Neither an individual’s smoking habits nor his 
or her subjective motivation in purchasing Marlboro Lights bears on the 
issue of whether the advertising was deceptive,” the court found.235  With 
respect to damages, the majority found that even if the class could not 
prove actual damages because Marlboro Lights were the same price as 
regular cigarettes, each member of the class would be entitled to 
statutory damages of $25 under the CPA.236  According to the court, an 
invasion of the legal right created by the CPA constitutes an injury in 
itself, regardless of whether the consumer experienced an economic 
loss.237 
Interpreting the same law, three dissenting judges reached the 
opposite conclusion.238  The dissent recognized that “[t]he requirement 
that the plaintiffs demonstrate an ‘injury’ may not be shrugged off 
lightly” and that a plaintiff cannot recover even nominal damages 
without making such a showing.239  The dissent found it was impossible 
for the plaintiffs to meet the “similar injury” requirement necessary for 
class certification under the statute because the plaintiffs conceded some 
class members actually did receive lower levels of tar and nicotine and, 
thus, were not harmed.240  The dissent concluded that, by certifying a 
class including uninjured members, the majority effectively permitted a 
“purely ‘vicarious suit[] by self-constituted private attorneys-
general.’”241 
Other courts have followed reasoning similar to the dissenting judges 
in Aspinal and refused to certify class actions in lights cases.  In Philip 
Morris USA Inc. v. Hines, a Florida appeals court interpreting Florida’s 
                                                     
 233. Id. at 486. 
 234. Id. at 486–89. 
 235. Id. at 489. 
 236. See id. at 490–91 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (West 1997)). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 493 (Cordy, J., dissenting, joined by Ireland, J. and Cowin, J.). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 493–94. 
 241. Id. at 495 (citing Leardi v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094, 1102 (Mass. 1985)).  Legislation 
introduced in the Massachusetts legislature would require plaintiffs suing under the state CPA to 
show an “actual out-of-pocket loss” to recover under the statute.  See S.B. 919, 2005–06 Leg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2005). 
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Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTP)242 reversed a lower 
court’s class certification.243  In a per curiam opinion, the Florida court 
recognized that “despite a common nucleus of facts concerning a 
prospective class-action-defendant’s conduct, a lawsuit may present 
individualized plaintiff-related issues which make it unsuitable for class 
certification.”244  The court found that the manner in which each class 
member smoked light cigarettes affected whether that member “reaped” 
the benefits of a cigarette with lower tar and nicotine.245  The court also 
recognized that some smokers may have purchased lights for their 
distinctive taste and not because of any perceived health value.246  These 
issues “could preclude an individual smoker’s entitlement to damages 
and, thus, would be legitimate issues raised in defense.”247 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers who file class actions can recover enormous sums 
of money without showing actual damages because many CPAs provide 
statutory damages.  While individual class members may only recover 
$25 under the Massachusetts statute,248 plaintiffs’ lawyers stand to 
recover contingency fees based on a percentage of the $25 recovered for 
every smoker of light cigarettes in the state.  Unless judges interpret state 
CPAs with caution, plaintiffs’ lawyers will continue to exploit CPAs to 
attack unpopular companies for hypothetical injuries without providing 
any real benefit to society. 249 
In 2003, a lights case resulted in the largest verdict in Illinois 
history—a $10.1-billion bench verdict against Philip Morris in Madison 
County, Illinois.  The verdict included $7.1 billion in compensatory 
damages, $1.77 billion of which was allocated for payment of attorneys’ 
fees, and $3 billion in punitive damages paid to the State of Illinois.250  
                                                     
 242. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211(2) (West 2002). 
 243. 883 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 244. Id. at 294. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 293–94. 
 247. Id. at 294. 
 248. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3)(4) (West 1997). 
 249. For instance, the McLawsuit and lights cases recently intersected in a California lawsuit.  
Lawyers, perhaps inspired by the use of CPAs to attack the fast food industry for obesity-related 
ailments and light cigarettes, have found a new target: breakfast cereal manufacturers.  In March 
2005, a California plaintiff brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of all consumers who had 
purchased “low-sugar” cereals against Kraft Foods, General Mills Cereals, and Kellogg USA, along 
with a local retailer.  Complaint, Hardee v. Del Mission Liquor, No. 844745 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed 
Mar. 24, 2005) (on file with authors).  The plaintiffs claimed that cereals advertised as low in sugar 
falsely represented that they were more nutritious than their “full-sugar” counterparts.  Id.  The 
complaint included a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Section 17200, and sought a 
permanent injunction, restitution, and attorneys’ fee and costs.  Id. 
 250. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608, at *29–30 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 
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The class in Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., involved all consumers who 
purchased light cigarettes in Illinois during a thirty-year period.251  In 
December 2005, a closely divided Illinois Supreme Court overturned the 
judgment, but on grounds unrelated to the appropriateness of class 
certification.252  First, the court closely examined federal regulation of 
light cigarettes during the past thirty-five years, including the FTC 
entrance into consent orders with the industry allowing manufacturers to 
use the terms “low,” “lower,” “reduced” tar, or “light” so long as all 
packaging and advertising included disclosure of tar and nicotine levels 
based on a federally specified testing method.253  The majority then 
found that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act’s exception to actions or 
transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any state or 
federal regulatory body or officer applied to bar the claim.254  It is 
important to note that the court’s decision was not based on federal 
preemption but rather on an interpretation of its own state consumer 
protection statute and recognition of “a legislative policy of deference to 
the authority granted by Congress or the General Assembly to federal 
and state regulatory agencies and a recognition of the need for regulated 
actors to be able to rely on the directions received from such agencies 
without risk that such reliance may expose them to tort liability.”255  The 
court also recognized that when a government agency regulates conduct, 
objections to that policy are appropriately made through the political 
process, not in the courts.256  Finally, in dicta, the majority questioned the 
appropriateness of class certification given not only the requirement that 
each individual member show that he or she was actually deceived by the 
defendant’s representations and that the advertising and not other 
motivators caused the purchase, but also the differences in the ways class 
members actually smoked the cigarettes.257 
                                                                                                                       
21, 2003), overruled on other grounds, 793 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), vacated, No. 96644, 
2003 Ill. LEXIS 2625 (Ill. Sept. 16, 2003). 
 251. Id. at *1. 
 252. See Price v. Philip Morris, No. 96326, 2005 WL 3434368 (Ill. Dec. 15, 2005). 
 253.  See id. at *1–14. 
 254.  See id. at *31–45.  The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act provides that it shall not apply to 
actions “specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under 
statutory authority of this State or the United States.”  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10b(1) (West 
1998). 
 255.  Price, 2005 WL 3434368, at *34. 
 256.  Id.  The court’s decision demonstrates its rejection of the much-criticized process of 
“regulation through litigation.”  See generally ·Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 225. 
 257.  See id. at *46–48; see also id. at *50–55 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring) (finding that 
the named plaintiffs could not show actual damages and examining the fundamental flaws in the 
damages methodology accepted by the circuit court). 
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The Price decision, and the split between members of the Illinois 
Supreme Court, again shows the fundamental choices available to courts 
in interpreting CPAs.  In addition, although the momentous award was 
ultimately overturned, plaintiffs’ lawyers may still look to the lower 
court ruling and the dissent in the Illinois Supreme Court to bring CPA 
lawsuits against “unpopular” industries.  Finally, the Price decision may 
increase the importance of statutory exemptions for conduct approved or 
authorized by federal or state government agencies.  Most CPAs include 
an exemption similar to that contained in the Illinois law,258 and their 
impact can extend well beyond light cigarette cases to other states and 
other products and services provided by highly regulated industries. 
3. Blaming Alcoholic Beverage Advertisements for Illegal Underage 
Drinking 
During the past two years, the alcoholic beverage industry has joined 
the tobacco industry as a popular target under CPAs.  In several states, 
lawyers have brought class actions against the industry alleging that its 
advertising induces teenagers to illegally buy and drink alcoholic 
beverages.259  The lawsuits seek disgorgement of the industry’s profits 
and statutory, treble and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees, where 
available.  In lawsuits inspired by state attorneys general against the 
cigarette companies, private lawyers allege that alcoholic beverage 
manufacturers violated CPAs by marketing their products to young 
people, including those under the legal drinking age.260  According to the 
complaints, the companies marketed their products to young consumers 
by producing malt-flavored beverages referred to by the plaintiffs as 
“alco-pops,” by featuring youthful models and partying in 
advertisements, and by placing advertisements in magazines and 
television shows that include a young audience.261  These lawsuits have 
sometimes arisen from tragedies in which an under-age drunk driver 
                                                     
 258.  See supra note 160. 
 259. See, e.g., Complaint, Goodwin v. Anheuser-Busch Cos. & Miller Brewing Co., No. 
BC310105 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A., filed Feb. 3, 2004); Complaint, Kreft v. Adolph Coors Co., No. 
03-CV-9229 (Colo. Dist. Ct., City & County of Denver, filed Dec. 3, 2003); Complaint, Hakki v. 
Zima Co., No. 03-CV-2621-GK (D.C. Super. Ct., filed Nov. 13, 2003); Complaint, Tomberlin v. 
Adolph Coors Co. No. 2005CV000545 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Madison, filed Feb. 23, 2005). 
 260. See Molly McDonough, Battle Over Liquor Just Beginning: One Suit is Dismissed, But 
Four Others Try to Link Ads and Kids, 4 ABA J., Feb. 11, 2005 (eReport on file with the KANSAS 
LAW REVIEW). 
 261. See arguments raised in cases cited supra note 259. 
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killed an individual,262 but plaintiffs do not seek compensation for these 
injuries.  Rather, the lawsuits seek to recover on behalf of all parents 
whose under-age children purchased alcoholic beverages over a period of 
two decades, a class estimated to include thousands of people. 
A California court dismissed the first of these cases to reach a 
decision in late 2004 and early 2005.263  In the first of two rulings, in 
December 2004, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Peter D. Lichtman 
dismissed a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Section 
17200.  Judge Lichtman found that the plaintiffs failed to allege actual 
loss of money or property as required by Proposition 64.264  The 
following month, Judge Lichtman dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining 
claims, including a claim under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act, which prohibits representing that goods or services have 
characteristics that they do not have.265  Judge Lichtman ruled that 
regulating alcohol advertisements was not within the jurisdiction of the 
courts but was the job of the Department of Alcoholic Beverages 
Control.266  Judge Lichtman also found that the plaintiffs did not identify 
any advertising that was misleading or false but focused on “puffery or 
on qualities that are not affirmations of fact such as the fun, sexiness, 
popularity, social acceptance, athleticism, etc. that drinking alcohol can 
bring.”267  The dismissal is on appeal.268 
                                                     
 262. See, e.g., Goodwin, No. BC310105 (parents sued after an eighteen-year-old drunk driver 
killed their daughter). 
 263. See Ruling on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Goodwin v. Anheuser-Busch Cos. & 
Miller Brewing Co., No. BC310105 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A., ruled Dec. 13, 2004). 
 264. See Myron Levin, Lawsuits Take Aim at Ads for Alcohol, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at C1 
(discussing Ruling on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Goodwin, No. BC310105). 
 265. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(5) (West 1998).  The California Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act is more narrowly confined than the state’s Unfair Competition Law, Section 17200, and is 
similar to other state CPAs. 
 266. See Ruling on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, at 6–7, Goodwin, No. BC310105. 
 267. Id. at 11.  First Amendment issues aside, the lawsuits against the alcoholic beverage 
industry for underage drinking defy fundamentals of tort law because plaintiffs cannot show that 
their children saw the advertisements, much less that the advertisements caused them to make a 
purchase.  In addition, plaintiffs do not assert any individual injury.  Instead, they seek 
disgorgement, a questionable remedy under CPAs given that unlike restitution, which requires a 
defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those from whom the 
property was taken, disgorgement is simply a taking of the defendant’s profits, with no showing of 
actual consumer loss.  Moreover, these lawsuits allege harms to society generally, a policy issue 
more appropriately considered by Congress, should it wish to further regulate the industry. 
 268. Likewise, a Colorado trial court dismissed a similar claim under the Colorado Consumer 
Protection Act in September 2005.  See Order of Court, Kreft v. Zima Beverage Co., No. 04CV1827 
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Jefferson County, Sept. 16, 2005) (on file with authors).  The Colorado trial court 
found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to show a legally cognizable injury to 
themselves or their children.  See id.  The dismissal in Kreft is on appeal. 
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4. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: Failure to Disclose Alleged Product 
Defects as a Deceptive Act 
Pharmaceutical companies are also seeing their share of CPA 
litigation despite the Food and Drug Administration’s rigorous regulation 
of drug advertising.  One example is In re West Virginia Rezulin 
Litigation v. Hutchinson.269  That case is a consolidation of several 
lawsuits filed by plaintiffs who used the FDA-approved drug Rezulin, a 
diabetes medication, which plaintiffs alleged caused liver damage in 
some patients.270  The plaintiffs argued that manufacturers aggressively 
and falsely marketed the drug as having breakthrough effectiveness with 
low side effects.271  Among their product liability claims, the plaintiffs, 
who used the drug but did not have signs of harm, included an action 
under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act 
(WVCCPA).272  The plaintiffs alleged the manufacturers committed a 
deceptive practice by not disclosing to consumers problems with the 
drug.273  Noting that it had never examined the WVCCPA in detail, the 
court went on to hold that the statutory requirement that a plaintiff show 
an “ascertainable loss” did not require a showing of actual damages.274  
While recognizing the WVCCPA “is not designed to afford a remedy for 
trifles,” the court found that the plaintiffs needed only to allege that they 
received a product that was different or inferior to that which they 
believed they purchased.275  Thus, West Virginia’s high court overturned 
the intermediate appellate court and certified the case.276 
More recently, a law firm filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of 
more than 150,000 Kentucky residents who took the popular arthritis 
drug Vioxx.277  The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer, Merck & 
Co., violated the CPA by advertising the drug to the public as safe 
without fully disclosing its known side effects.278  The plaintiffs are 
seeking damages up to $75,000 (to avoid federal diversity jurisdiction) 
                                                     
 269. 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003). 
 270. Id. at 58. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 60. 
 273. Id.  The plaintiffs sought medical monitoring and punitive damages.  Id. at 59–60. 
 274. Id. at 74. 
 275. Id. at 75. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See Beth Musgrave, Vioxx Class-Action Suit in State Law; Firm Says 150,000 Kentuckians 
Took Drug, Weren’t Told of Risks, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 26, 2004, at B6. 
 278. Id. 
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for each Kentucky resident who used the drug.279  Unlike product 
liability lawsuits filed against Merck in other states,280 both the Kentucky 
suit and a similar suit in Oklahoma were brought under the states’ 
CPAs.281  This allowed plaintiffs’ lawyers in Kentucky to sue on behalf 
of a class of individuals who did not experience any physical injury but 
merely purchased the drug.282  Those cases are ongoing as of the time of 
this writing.283 
V. COMMON-SENSE CONSTRUCTION BY COURTS OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACTS 
The history of states interpreting and applying CPAs demonstrates 
that courts often wield a great deal of power in shaping private rights of 
action under the law.  As this Article has shown, most statutes require 
some degree of causal connection between a violation of the CPA and an 
injury, but few address the other fundamental elements of torts, such as 
reliance, intent, and damages.284  CPAs may also lack a trigger for an 
award of treble damages or attorneys’ fees, and they may fail to address 
the availability of class action relief under the law’s already generous 
provisions.285  Courts can allow use of their state’s CPA to attack what 
may be lawful conduct in other states, or they can limit application of the 
                                                     
 279. Id. 
 280. The first Vioxx case to go to trial resulted in a $253.5-million award, $24.5 million in 
economic damages and $229 million in punitive damages, to a single plaintiff.  Alex Berenson, Jury 
Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at A6.  The product 
liability lawsuit involved a man who died of cardiac arrhythmia, a condition not previously linked to 
Vioxx.  Richard Stewart, Legal Armies Set to Wage Big-Dollar Vioxx Battle; Lawsuit’s Cost Likely 
to Run into Millions of Dollars, HOUSTON CHRON., July 18, 2005, at B1.  Under Texas law, which 
places caps on punitive damages, the $229 million punitive damage award must be reduced to $1.6 
million, putting the total award at $26.1 million.  Berenson, supra.  Merck has indicated that it will 
appeal the verdict.  Following the Texas verdict, a New Jersey jury found Merck not liable in 
another Vioxx case.  See Alex Berenson, Merck is Winner in Vioxx Lawsuit on Heart Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A1. 
 281. See Musgrave, supra note 277; see also Complaint, House v. Merck & Co., No. 04-1235 
(W.D. Okla., filed Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.federmanlaw.com/pdf/CompHouse.pdf 
(alleging violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and Oklahoma Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act in addition to product liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranty claims). 
 282. See Merck & Co.: Getty & Mayo Lodges Consumer Fraud Lawsuit in KY, IBL CLASS 
ACTION REP., Oct. 2004, vol. 6, No. 213, available at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/041027.mbx 
(“We are not seeking compensation for personal injury in this suit.”). 
 283. See Jurisdiction & Procedure: Vioxx Claims Against Merck are Remanded to State Court, 
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., Mar. 2005, vol. 88, No. 2197 (reporting that the Kentucky 
case was removed from the Circuit Court for Pike County but then remanded to state court by the 
federal court). 
 284. See supra Part III.A. 
 285. See supra Part III.B–C, E. 
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law to protect their citizens from conduct within their jurisdiction.  These 
are all areas where courts, recognizing the difference between 
government enforcement to protect the public and private litigation, can 
interpret the law to keep it true to its public purpose and protect its broad 
provisions from abuse. 
A. Requiring Injury in Fact 
Perhaps the most basic requirement to bringing a lawsuit is that the 
plaintiff suffer some injury.  Apart from a showing of wrongful conduct 
and causation, proof of actual harm to the plaintiff has been an 
indispensable part of civil actions.286  As the Supreme Court of the 
United States has recognized for purposes of standing in the appellate 
context, “injury in fact” requires “more than an injury to a cognizable 
interest.  It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the 
injured.”287  Despite the broad language of CPAs that provide a cause of 
action to “any person” for violations of the act, and legislative 
instructions that such statutes be construed liberally, courts should not 
disregard the threshold issue of standing. 
For example, despite vague statutory language, the Colorado 
Supreme Court has properly required “(a) injury in fact; (b) to a legally 
protected interest.”288  The court rejected a claim that literally anyone 
could bring a lawsuit under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act 
(CCPA) and noted that it was injury in fact and causation that 
distinguished private actions from those brought by the Attorney 
General.289  Even a dissenting justice understood that although the CCPA 
“does not on its face require that a plaintiff prove injury in order to bring 
a claim,” a literal interpretation of the statute “would violate 
constitutional standing principles because a plaintiff could sue for 
damages without having suffered an injury.”290 
In Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., a federal court interpreting the 
District of Columbia’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act (DCCPPA) 
came to a similar conclusion.291  In that case, patients prescribed 
                                                     
 286. For example, most courts that have recently considered the availability of lawsuits for 
medical monitoring in the absence of a present physical injury have rejected such claims.  See Victor 
E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 
361 (2005). 
 287. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972). 
 288. Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 235 (Colo. 1998) (en banc). 
 289. Id. at 236. 
 290. Id. at 240 (Kourlis, J., dissenting). 
 291. 297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177–78 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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OxyContin, a medication for chronic pain relief, brought a class action 
lawsuit against pharmaceutical manufacturers for deceptive advertising 
in promoting the drug.292  The plaintiffs sought statutory penalties, treble 
damages, and punitive damages.293  The court was faced squarely with 
the question of “whether patients who were prescribed a drug for pain, 
and who personally suffered no ill effects or lack of efficacy, can sue for 
money damages” under the DCCPPA.294  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
manufacturer over-promoted the drug as providing “smooth and 
sustained” pain relief for twelve hours with little chance of addiction, 
which allowed the manufacturer to artificially inflate its prices.295  Yet, 
the plaintiffs specifically excluded from the class “all patients who failed 
to receive 12-hour relief from OxyContin and/or who had problems with 
it alleged addictive qualities,” recognizing that the failure to exclude 
such groups would result in a product liability lawsuit, not a consumer 
protection action.296  Instead, the class included only those who simply 
purchased the allegedly overpriced drug.297 
After reaffirming that only consumers actually harmed can recover 
through tort law, the court considered the “more difficult question” of 
whether an individual could recover under the district’s consumer 
protection statute when the alleged injury was a higher price caused by 
the defendant’s promotional tactics.298  Unlike the West Virginia court in 
the Rezulin case,299 the federal court rejected this “fraud on the market 
theory,” finding that “[s]tanding requires ‘individualized proof’ of both 
the fact and extent of the injury.”300  The court summarized its reasoning 
for dismissing the complaint: “While [the complaint] asserts that 
defendants engaged in false and misleading advertising, it does not plead 
that these defendants [sic] were in any way deceived—or even saw—any 
of that advertising.  It also fails to allege any particularized and specific 
injury-in-fact suffered by these plaintiffs.”301  The court advised the 
plaintiffs that, should they wish to pursue consumer protection violations 
before people are injured, the proper forum is to go through the 
government’s administrative procedure for enforcement of the 
                                                     
 292. Id. at 172. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 175. 
 296. Id. at 173. 
 297. Id. at 173, 175. 
 298. Id. at 176–77. 
 299. See supra notes 269–76 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Williams, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
 301. Id. 
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DCCPPA.302  “The invasion of a purely legal right without harm to the 
consumer—in this case to freedom from alleged false and misleading 
advertising—can be addressed through the administrative process of the 
Government of the District of Columbia.”303  Regulation through civil 
liability suits is both unwarranted and unnecessary where an 
administrative governmental process is in place. 
B. Requiring Reasonable Reliance 
The need to show reliance is an issue not addressed by most state 
statutes, which allow for judicial interpretation in light of legislative 
intent, fundamentals of tort law, and public policy.  Courts should require 
plaintiffs asserting CPA claims to show that they actually and reasonably 
relied on the allegedly deceptive representation. 
While state attorneys general should be able to stop deceptive 
conduct by obtaining injunctive relief against a business before 
consumers are misled, individuals who never saw, heard, or relied upon 
the conduct that allegedly injured them should not be able to bring 
imaginary claims.  If the allegedly deceptive conduct did not influence 
the plaintiff by affecting his or her decision to purchase the product, 
there should be no private right of action.  To do otherwise would 
eviscerate the fundamental distinction between private rights of action, 
which are based on harm to an individual, and public enforcement of a 
law, which may not be.  The Supreme Court of the United States recently 
reaffirmed that the foundation of statutory rights of action for fraud 
requires justifiable reliance and “has long insisted that a plaintiff in such 
a case show . . . that had he known the truth he would not have acted.”304 
There is a strong public-policy basis for confining misrepresentation 
and concealment claims to cases involving actual, material reliance.  The 
alternative is to create a broad cause of action allowing members of the 
general public to sue based on purported misinformation they did not 
hear or omissions they did not act upon.  Such a course would broadly 
expand potential liability and free it from the common-sense bounds 
developed over centuries recognizing the distinction between public and 
private rights of action.  The elimination of actual reliance and other 
“self-limiting principles” of common law actions could also chill free 
 
                                                     
 302. Id. at 178. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (2005) (considering the common law 
roots of a private right of action for securities fraud). 
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Speech, raising serious First Amendment concerns, as Solicitor General 
Theodore B. Olson has argued to the Supreme Court.305 
Courts should look to the common-sense rulings by the high courts 
of Kansas and Pennsylvania for guidance and wisdom.  For example, in 
Finstad v. Washburn University, a group of college students brought an 
action seeking civil penalties for a violation of the Kansas Consumer 
Protection Act (KCPA) alleging that the university falsely stated in its 
catalogue that it was accredited or approved by the National Shorthand 
Reporters Association.306  The students conceded that they had not relied 
on this statement in enrolling in the program and that many, if not all, of 
them were unaware of it.307  Nevertheless, the students claimed they were 
“aggrieved,” in the words of the KCPA, because they paid tuition for a 
program that was not accredited.308  The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court’s dismissal of the claim on summary judgment.309  The 
court noted that although a loss or injury was not required in an action by 
the Attorney General, in a private lawsuit, it would “not interpret an 
aggrieved consumer to be one who is neither aware of nor damaged by a 
violation of the Act.”310  In other words, those individuals who were 
neither aware of nor damaged by an actor’s violation could not recover.  
Common sense was infused into the law. 
In the Pennsylvania case, Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., gasoline 
consumers brought a class action lawsuit against Sunoco under the 
state’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection law.311  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the company deceptively induced consumers to 
purchase its trademarked high-octane gasoline when their vehicles did 
                                                     
 305. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/ 
2002/3mer/1ami/2002-0575.mer.ami.pdf.  Solicitor General Olson argued that the lack of “self-
limiting principles” of common law actions, such as the requirement of actual injury and reasonable 
reliance, as well as the absence of “institutional checks” on government enforcement, such as 
political accountability and limited resources, may render private rights of action under CPAs 
unconstitutional in some circumstances.  Id. at 12, 18.  Ultimately, the Court did not reach the merits 
of the case.  See Nike, 539 U.S. at 655 (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor, dissented and would have decided the case.  Id. at 666–
67 (Breyer, J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting).  They found that “a private ‘false advertising’ 
action brought on behalf of the State, by one who has suffered no injury, threatens to impose a 
serious burden upon speech” and “can easily chill a speaker’s efforts to engage in public debate.”  
Id. at 679–80. 
 306. 845 P.2d 685, 687 (Kan. 1993). 
 307. Id. at 688, 691. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 694. 
 310. Id. at 691–92. 
 311. 777 A.2d 442, 443–44 (Pa. 2001). 
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not need it.312  In affirming the trial court’s decision to deny class 
certification, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that 
“Commonwealth actions and private actions are distinguishable” in that 
the Attorney General may bring actions to restrain deceptive conduct “in 
the public interest,” while private litigants must show an ascertainable 
loss as a result of a violation of the act.313  The court found nothing in 
the statute that authorized a private individual to attack an advertiser 
because consumers “might” be deceived.314  The court held that 
“[n]othing in the legislative history suggests that the legislature ever 
intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away 
with the traditional common law elements of reliance and causation.”315  
Because each individual plaintiff would need to show that he or she 
heard and believed the advertising and purchased it for household (as 
opposed to business) purposes, and was damaged as a result, the court 
found class certification inappropriate.316  In so holding, the court 
accepted the defendant’s argument that 
while the attorney general may bring an action to restrain advertising 
which might “have a tendency to deceive a substantial segment” of the 
public and which is “likely to” influence purchasing decisions, private 
plaintiffs have no standing to bring actions in the public interest but 
must prove that they themselves were actually deceived and that the 
advertising actually influenced their purchasing decisions.317 
There may be circumstances where there is a public need to address 
misrepresentations even where there has been no reliance.  For example, 
a misleading Internet advertisement promoting a product that no one has 
actually bought might present such a situation.  That need should be met 
by federal and state government enforcement of consumer protection 
statutes but not through civil claims for fraud.  This is the government’s 
proper role.  The role of liability law, however, is to compensate people 
who have been actually harmed.318 
                                                     
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 445. 
 314. Id. at 446. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 445. 
 318. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, § 1, at 5–6. 
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C. Factoring in Culpability 
Fault has been a predicate throughout the history of liability law.  
This has been universally true when the basis for an award is punishment 
or deterrence.319  To some extent, CPAs have created a type of strict 
liability for advertising claims and any other conduct that can be 
considered unfair or deceptive.  Some courts have ruled that a business 
may be liable for a violation of the statute regardless of whether it 
intended to deceive the consumer or commit the deceptive practice.  
Further, some states automatically impose not only actual damages but 
also statutory and treble damages even when plaintiffs failed to show that 
defendants were at fault.320 
In this context, common sense dictates that courts require a showing 
of some degree of culpability.  An Illinois appellate court agreed with 
this basic premise and found under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practices Act that “not all misrepresentations are 
actionable; only those for which culpability can be shown.”321  There are 
several ways that this can be accomplished.  First, particularly with 
respect to cases in which a consumer alleges that a business omitted or 
concealed a material fact, courts should not find that such an omission or 
concealment is a “deceptive act” unless the defendant intended to 
deceive the public or consumers relied on the missing information.322 
Second, in states in which the law provides courts with discretion to 
award treble damages, courts should require proof that the defendant 
intended to deceive consumers as a predicate for punishment.  For 
example, Alabama’s statute provides that a court must consider several 
factors in deciding whether to award treble damages including: (1) “the 
amount of the actual damages awarded;” (2) “the frequency of the 
unlawful acts or practices;” (3) “the number of persons adversely 
affected thereby;” and (4) “the extent to which the unlawful acts or 
practices were committed intentionally.”323  Courts in states in which 
                                                     
 319. See PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 550 (discussing the use of punitive 
damages to punish and discourage bad acts). 
 320. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
 321. See Elson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 691 N.E.2d 807, 817 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) 
(affirming the dismissal of a claim under the Consumer Fraud Act where the plaintiffs did not plead 
with specificity the “deceptive act” component of the claim, including the defendant’s knowledge of 
the misrepresentation or omission); see also Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 99, 104 
(Ill. 1997) (finding no violation of the Consumer Fraud Act where the defendant made “an honest 
mistake” and had no intent to deceive or defraud the plaintiffs or to omit or conceal information with 
the intent that plaintiffs would rely on such action). 
 322. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 323. ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). 
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treble damages are discretionary can similarly incorporate an element of 
intent.  Nevertheless, courts have chosen not to do so.324 
In addition, where state laws provide for either automatic treble 
damages or statutory damages in excess of actual damages, or both, 
courts should read an intent requirement into the statute where the 
language of the law does not prohibit it. 
Finally, where punitive damages are available, courts should be 
bound by the standards of evidence, level of culpability, and 
constitutional limitations applicable in all such cases.  In addition, courts 
should follow the majority view that treble damages and punitive 
damages may not be awarded for the same conduct.325  Such duplicative 
awards raise significant constitutional issues and are fundamentally 
unfair.326 
D. Requiring a Nexus Between the Misrepresentation and the Injury 
Apart from showing a plaintiff relied on the defendant’s 
misrepresentation, courts utilizing common-sense interpretations of 
CPAs require plaintiffs to show that the misrepresentation was the 
proximate cause of their injuries.  In other words, to bring a private right 
of action, individuals must be able to show that a business’s alleged 
wrongful conduct led in a meaningful way to an economic loss; 
otherwise, the basic, fundamental difference between public law and 
private law is eliminated. 
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the need for a plaintiff to show causation in an analogous 
situation—under federal securities fraud actions.327  The Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 is similar to the FTC Act in that it prohibits “use 
or employ[ment] . . . [of] any . . . deceptive device” in the purchase or 
sale of any security.328  Unlike the FTC Act, however, courts have found 
                                                     
 324. See, e.g., Plath v. Schonrock, 64 P.3d 984, 990 (Mont. 2003) (finding that an award of 
treble damages under the Montana Consumer Protection Act does not require a showing that the 
defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, but is determined on a case-by-case basis guided 
by the purpose of protecting the public from unfair or deceptive practices and making it 
economically feasible to bring civil actions). 
 325. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 326. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279–80 (1989) 
(affirming a punitive damage award from judgment requiring plaintiff to choose between treble 
damage award and punitive damage award); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 198 N.W.2d 363, 
367 (Wis. 1972) (finding that “to allow treble damages and punitive damages would amount to 
double recovery and [would] violate the basic fairness of a judicial proceeding”). 
 327. 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (2005). 
 328. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005) (prohibiting the making 
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an implied private right of action under the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934, and Congress “has imposed statutory requirements on that 
private action.”329  In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a plaintiff could show loss causation simply by 
alleging that the price of the security was inflated on the date of purchase 
because of a misrepresentation.330  First, the Court restated the “basic” 
elements of a private right of action, which include “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; 
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) 
economic loss; and (6) ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a causal connection between 
the material misrepresentation and the loss.”331  It then emphasized the 
common law roots of a private right of action, observing that the purpose 
of securities statutes is not to provide “broad insurance against market 
losses, but to protect [purchasers] against those economic losses that 
misrepresentations actually cause.”332  Thus, the Court found that a 
plaintiff experienced no economic loss attributable to a misrepresentation 
simply because the market price might have been inflated at a particular 
moment in time.333  The Supreme Court did not permit plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to twist a statutory action rooted in common law fraud, as are CPAs, into 
broad insurance policies or extended warranty programs.  This decision 
should be a beacon for common-sense construction of CPAs. 
E. Upholding Traditional Requirements for Class Action Certification 
and Preventing a Windfall to Attorneys 
Class actions under state CPAs have become a favorite for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers because of the potential for extraordinary damages for violations 
of a vague law.  Class actions place tremendous pressure on businesses 
to settle regardless of the merits or whether class certification is 
appropriate because an unfavorable ruling—however misguided—could 
result in millions (or billions) of dollars in liability.334  For this reason, it 
                                                                                                                       
of any “untrue statement of . . . material fact” or the omission of any material fact “necessary in 
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading”). 
 329. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000); Dura Pharm., 125 S. Ct. at 1631 (citing Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 744 (1975));  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
196 (1976). 
 330. 125 S. Ct. at 1629. 
 331. Id. at 1631. 
 332. Id. at 1633. 
 333. Id. 
 334. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing 
that defendants in a class action lawsuit “may not wish to roll these dice.  That is putting it mildly.  
They will be under intense pressure to settle”). 
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is particularly important for courts to ensure fair treatment in class 
actions asserting private CPA claims. 
The purpose of class actions is to provide an efficient vehicle for 
claim resolution where multiple plaintiffs have suffered nearly the same 
injury under the same law.335  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
analogous state rules permit class certification only when “questions of 
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”336  This requirement 
ensures that class actions do not provide a mechanism to ignore 
fundamentals of tort law through aggregation of claims by allowing 
plaintiffs to prove liability through generic showings of elements of 
causes of action.337  In some cases, not only defendants but also plaintiffs 
could suffer from ill-conceived CPA class actions: for example, when a 
plaintiff’s home state’s CPA provides for greater relief than the forum 
state.338  Thus, when individual issues such as reliance, damages, and 
applicable state law predominate, class certification is inappropriate 
because courts must decide these issues class member by class 
member.339 
Courts in several states have properly construed class action rules 
and followed common sense in recognizing that class actions brought 
under CPAs are improper when individual factual or legal issues 
predominate.  For example, in Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 
Maryland’s highest court rejected a class action brought on behalf of all 
Maryland cigarette and smokeless tobacco users, a purported class of 
                                                     
 335. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note: 
[The class action rule] encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve 
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons 
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other 
undesirable results. . . .  In this view, a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use 
of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action. . . .  On the 
other hand, although having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for 
treatment as a class action if there was material variation in the representations made or 
in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the person to whom they were addressed. 
(emphasis added). See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622–25 (1997) (ruling 
that an asbestos class action suit did not meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement because of 
the various individual issues present (e.g., differing levels of exposure) and disparities in state law). 
 336. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
 337. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 693–94 (Tex. 2002) (“The procedural 
device of a class action eliminates the necessity of adducing the same evidence over and over again 
in a multitude of individual actions; it does not lessen the quality of evidence required in an 
individual action or relax substantive burdens of proof.”). 
 338. See, e.g., id. at 695 (“Class members who live in states whose laws do not cap exemplary or 
statutory damages or require proof by clear and convincing evidence must suffer the limits imposed 
by Texas law . . . .”). 
 339. Id. at 692–99. 
SCHWARTZ FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:54:23 AM 
2005] COMMON-SENSE CONSTRUCTION 59 
hundreds of thousands of people.340  Among the claims asserted by the 
class members was a claim that tobacco companies and their Maryland 
distributors violated several provisions of the Maryland Consumer 
Protection Act (MCPA).341  The court reasoned that individual issues, 
chiefly reliance, predominated over common issues with respect to the 
class’s MCPA claims.342  “The unsuitability of such claims for class 
action treatment arises from the burden placed on [the class members] of 
proving individual reliance upon [Defendants’] alleged 
misrepresentations and material omissions . . . .”343  Noting how reliance 
could vary significantly from plaintiff to plaintiff, the court stated, 
“[s]uch individual discrepancies obviously cannot be glossed over at trial 
on a class-wide basis but must be allowed to be delved into by 
[Defendants], class member by class member.”344 
A ruling by the Supreme Court of Texas provides another example of 
how courts can properly evaluate the appropriateness of class action 
certification of private CPA claims.  In Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 
the court rejected a class action brought by some 20,000 dentists located 
in all fifty states against the makers of office management software.345  
The complaint alleged several causes of action, including violations of 
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices—Consumer Protection Act 
(TDTP).346  The court found that proof of reliance was a necessary 
element of a successful cause of action under the TDTP and that the class 
members failed to show that common issues of reliance predominated 
over individual ones.347  In so holding, the court remarked on how class 
actions cannot be used to avoid proving reliance, as required in an 
individual lawsuit: 
                                                     
 340. 752 A.2d 200, 234–36 (Md. 2000). 
 341. Id. at 206. 
 342. Id. at 234–36. 
 343. Id. at 234. 
 344. Id. at 236.  Pennsylvania provides another example.  In Weinberg v. Sun Co., the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a class action brought under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (PUTP) against a producer of high-octane gasoline because 
individual questions of fact predominated over common ones.  777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001).  The 
court held that “[t]he [PUTP] clearly requires, in a private action, that a plaintiff suffer an 
ascertainable loss as a result of the defendant’s prohibited action.”  Id.  The court clarified this 
holding: “That means, in this case, a plaintiff must allege reliance, that he purchased [the high-
octane gasoline] because he heard and believed [Defendant’s] false advertising that [the high-octane 
gasoline] would enhance engine performance.”  Id.  See also notes 312–17 and accompanying text 
(discussing Weinberg). 
 345. 102 S.W.3d 675, 693–94 (Tex. 2002). 
 346. Id. at 680. 
 347. Id. at 693. 
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[E]vidence insufficient to prove reliance in a suit by an individual does 
not become sufficient in a class action simply because there are more 
plaintiffs.  Inescapably individual differences cannot be concealed in a 
throng.  The procedural device of a class action eliminates the necessity 
of adducing the same evidence over and over again in a multitude of 
individual actions; it does not lessen the quality of evidence required in 
an individual action or relax substantive burdens of proof.348 
The court also found that damages—consequential, exemplary, and 
statutory—would have to be determined class member by class 
member.349  For example, to recover exemplary damages under the 
TDTP, class members must prove fraud, which requires proof of 
reliance, or malice, which requires proof of specific intent or subjective 
awareness of an extreme risk.350  As the court indicated, the defendants’ 
conduct may have varied over the relevant periods.351  In addition, the 
court found that the class members failed to show that legal issues 
predominated, given the applicability of the laws of many states.352  As 
the court recognized, “[s]tate and federal courts have overwhelmingly 
rejected class certification when multiple states’ laws must be 
applied.”353 
These decisions illustrate that class action certification is 
inappropriate if the case involves plaintiffs from multiple states because 
state CPA requirements and rules regarding class certification vary 
substantially.  Indeed, as noted previously, some states do not allow class 
actions under their CPAs,354 and, even if the case involves class members 
from the same state, certification is inappropriate if individual factual 
issues such as reliance and damages predominate. 
Because these deficiencies are common in attempted class actions 
involving CPAs, courts should only certify CPA classes in very limited 
circumstances: (1) when the plaintiffs are located in a single state and the 
CPA of one state applies; (2) when all class members were subject to 
precisely the same conduct; and (3) when damages are identical for each 
plaintiff, for example, when each was charged an undisclosed fee in an 
identical transaction. 
                                                     
 348. Id. at 693–94. 
 349. Id. at 694–95. 
 350. Id. at 695. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. at 699. 
 353. Id. at 698–99. 
 354. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(f) (LexisNexis 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) 
(2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(4) (2000); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(1), (3) (2002). 
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When CPAs allow for reasonable interpretation, such as where they 
do not specifically provide for the availability of class action lawsuits, 
courts that allow class action lawsuits355 should at least limit relief to 
actual damages.  Statutory damages in class actions serve little purpose.  
Statutory damages were meant to provide an individual plaintiff with the 
ability to bring a lawsuit when the anticipated damages are otherwise too 
low to provide an attorney with adequate incentive to take a case.356  
Similarly, class actions were meant to provide incentive to sue through 
the aggregation of claims when individual damages are otherwise too 
low.357  Thus, the incentive-creating effect of statutory damages is 
rendered duplicative when statutory damages are available in a class 
action.  As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers, not plaintiffs, receive a windfall 
because they receive a percentage of the statutory fees multiplied by 
potentially thousands or millions of class members, even though 
statutory damages were unnecessary to create incentive to bring the 
suit.358 
F. Placing Rational Limits on Extraterritorial Application 
To avoid forum shopping and to uphold principles of state 
sovereignty, courts should use a common-sense construction of CPAs 
and only apply them to conduct that occurred within the state in which 
they sit.  Some courts have taken an unduly expansive view of the 
jurisdictional reach of their states’ CPAs.  Such rulings allow plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to file claims in jurisdictions where the state CPA may provide 
for lower evidentiary standards or more generous relief.  They may file 
such claims even though the conduct in question has only a tangential 
                                                     
 355. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 247–48 (D. Del. 2002), 
aff’d, 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004); London v. Green Acres Trust, 765 P.2d 538, 545 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1988); Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 676 N.W.2d 29, 37–38 (Neb. 2004); Super Glue Corp. v. Avis 
Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 517 N.Y.S.2d 764, 767–68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Smith v. Behr Process 
Corp., 54 P.3d 665, 672–75 (Wash. 2002). 
 356. See Sovern, supra note 17, at 462 (“Consumer cases are typically for small stakes; that is 
why it is necessary to offer statutory, multiple, and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees—because 
otherwise few consumers would sue.”). 
 357. See Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“‘The policy at the very 
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide 
the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.  A class action 
solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.’” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
 358. See, e.g., Washington v. Spitzer Mgmt., Inc., No. 81612, 2003 WL 1759617, at *5 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2003) (recognizing that Ohio’s CPA authorizes class actions but limits recovery to 
actual damages “to protect defendants from huge damage awards in class actions”). 
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relationship to the forum.  These decisions undermine the public policy 
of sister states and invite inappropriate forum shopping. 
When a local court in one state applies that state’s law to regulate 
trade practices in another state, its intervention undermines all states’ 
autonomy and ability to regulate conduct within their borders.  In 
addition, when a court gives its state’s CPA extraterritorial application, 
businesses may be penalized for a transaction that may have been 
perfectly legal in the state in which it occurred but that is found to violate 
a foreign court’s interpretation of “unfair or deceptive” under another 
state law.  For example, in Steed Realty v. Oveisi, a Tennessee appellate 
court held that plaintiffs from both Tennessee and Mississippi could 
bring an action under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act arising out 
of transactions for real property located in Mississippi because the 
defendant “conducted trade and commerce in part in Tennessee by 
advertising and closing . . . real estate deals in [the] state.”359 
A number of highly respected courts have followed sound public 
policy and common-sense construction of CPAs.  They have properly 
limited application of a state’s CPA to conduct that occurred within that 
particular state.  For example, in Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp., 
a federal district court found that the District of Columbia Consumer 
Protection Act did not reach a fraudulent loan issued by a Virginia 
corporation in Virginia even though it affected a resident of the District 
of Columbia.360  The court properly observed that “the District of 
Columbia statute would have to be given broad extraterritorial effect if it 
were to apply here.”361  Similarly, in Shorter v. Champion Home Builders 
Co., a perceptive federal district court judge held that the Ohio Consumer 
Sales Practices Act is “only applicable if the offending conduct took 
place within the territorial boarders of the state of Ohio.”362 
In August 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously overturned 
a $1.2-billion, judge-issued verdict in Avery v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. involving out-of-state conduct.363  The case 
                                                     
 359. 823 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).  See also IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-602(2), -
603 (2003) (prohibiting deceptive practices either “within the state of Idaho, or directly or indirectly 
affecting the people of this state”). 
 360. 659 F. Supp. 611, 616–17 (D.D.C. 1987). 
 361. Id. at 616. 
 362. 776 F. Supp. 333, 338–39 (N.D. Ohio 1991).  See also Oce Printing Sys. U.S., Inc. v. 
Mailers Data Servs., Inc., 760 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).  In Oce Printing, a 
Florida appellate court refused to certify a nationwide class of plaintiffs seeking relief under the 
Florida Unfair Trade Act (FUTA).  Id.  The court concluded that FUTA was “enacted to protect in-
state consumers,” and noted that, “‘[o]ther states can protect their own residents.’”  Id. 
 363. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). 
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was brought as a nationwide class action covering 4.75 million State 
Farm policyholders in forty-eight states.364  The plaintiffs alleged breach 
of contract and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act because of the insurer’s practice of specifying the 
use of non-original equipment manufacturer parts (non-OEM parts) in 
auto repairs.365  Non-OEM parts are repair parts made by other 
companies that are not affiliated with the automobile companies, the 
“original equipment manufacturers.”366  Specifying non-OEM parts 
reduces repair costs and allows insurers to hold down the cost of 
automobile insurance premiums.367  According to one industry observer, 
non-OEM parts can be as much as forty percent cheaper.368  For this 
reason, Illinois and many other states expressly allow, and some states 
require, insurance companies to specify non-OEM parts, and no state 
prohibits the specification of non-OEM parts.369  The Illinois Supreme 
Court rejected nationwide class certification on the contract claims 
because the language of the insurance policies at issue varied from state 
to state and from policyholder to policyholder.370  The court also rejected 
class certification on the consumer fraud claims primarily because the 
class included out-of-state plaintiffs and repairs that occurred outside of 
Illinois: “The only putative class that can exist in this case under the 
Consumer Fraud Act is a class consisting of policyholders whose 
vehicles were assessed and repaired in Illinois.”371 
G. Preventing Conversion of Product Liability and Other Claims into 
CPA Claims 
Statutory actions under state CPAs and other claims are distinct 
causes of action.  Yet, the vague language of CPAs has enticed some 
plaintiffs’ lawyers who may be unable to prove the fundamental elements 
of another statutory action, a common tort claim, or a contract claim to 
                                                     
 364. Id. at 813. 
 365. Id. at 810. 
 366. Id. at 810–11. 
 367. Rick Cornejo, Ill. Supreme Court Overturns $1 Billion Aftermarket Parts Decision in Favor 
of State Farm, A.M. BEST NEWSWIRE, Aug. 18, 2005. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through 
Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (2001). 
 370. Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 818–24. 
 371. Id. at 855.  See also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 
1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“State consumer-protection laws vary considerably, and courts must 
respect these differences rather than apply one state’s law to sales in other states with different 
rules.”). 
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couch their lawsuit in CPA terms.372  This is a particular problem with 
respect to product liability lawsuits where a plaintiff who is unable to 
show a defective design alternatively alleges that a manufacturer is liable 
under a CPA because it misrepresented a product design, feature, or level 
of safety, or did not disclose certain risks or dangers associated with the 
product.373 
A recent example of this perilous trend is a group of class action 
lawsuits brought by fourteen residents and filed initially in eight states 
seeking $5 billion from DuPont stemming from its use of the popular 
nonstick coat, Teflon.  The CPA claims alleged that a chemical used in 
Teflon was dangerous and that DuPont failed to adequately warn 
consumers of the risk, despite no hard evidence that the chemical was 
harmful to humans when used in cookware.374  While this sounds like a 
typical product liability lawsuit, plaintiffs’ lawyers quickly pointed out 
that they “‘don’t have to prove that it causes cancer,’” under CPAs, but 
only that the company kept information from the public.375  The lawsuits 
sought compensation to replace the pots and pans of most Americans376 
and to establish two funds to pay for medical monitoring and scientific 
research.377  Such lawsuits do not appear to involve the everyday 
consumer transactions for which CPAs were anticipated.  Rather, they 
appear to be product liability claims where lawyers would have difficulty 
showing that the product is unreasonably dangerous, that it caused any 
injury, or resulted in any loss to the plaintiff. 
Despite suits of this nature, thus far, courts appear to have kept their 
collective finger in this dam.  A Maryland case, Shreve v. Sears, Roebuck 
                                                     
 372. See, e.g., Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 835–38 (finding that the plaintiffs’ class action began as a 
claim for breach of contract, then was amended to add a statutory consumer fraud claim that did no 
more than restate the contract claim, and was amended yet again to focus on statements or actions 
during the claims process, rather than promises contained in the contract language, to avoid 
dismissal and maintain class certification). 
 373. See generally Philip E. Karmel & Peter R. Paden, Consumer Protection Law Claims in 
Toxic Torts Litigation, 234 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2005) (examining CPA claims involving Teflon, cigarettes, 
and sport utility vehicles, and commenting that CPAs are the latest in a “recurring motif in toxic torts 
litigation” where innovative plaintiffs’ attorneys seek to assert a product liability claim without the 
need to prove that their client was injured by the product). 
 374. See Amy Cortese, Will Environmental Fear Stick to DuPont’s Teflon?, N.Y. TIMES, July 
24, 2005, at 34. 
 375. John Heilprin, DuPont Hit With $5 Billion Suit Over Teflon Risks, ASSOC. PRESS, July 20, 
2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1121763922530 (quoting plaintiffs’ 
attorney Alan Kluger). 
 376. See Dawn McCarty, DuPont Sued Over Data on Teflon, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 20, 2005, at 
C7 (quoting plaintiffs’ attorney Alan Kluger as stating, “[t]he class of potential plaintiffs could well 
contain almost every American that has purchased a pot or pan coated with DuPont’s nonstick 
coating”). 
 377. Heilprin, supra note 375. 
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& Co.,378 provides an example.  In that case, Mr. Shreve and his wife 
brought a product liability action against the manufacturer and seller of a 
snow thrower, alleging that he was injured while using the machine 
because of an alleged defect in a safety device incorporated into the 
design.380  The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants committed an 
unfair and deceptive trade practice when they failed either to 
communicate to the plaintiff that the machine lacked an adequate guard 
or to depict the operation of the “impeller” blade, and when they 
committed other alleged misrepresentations in the owner’s manual.381  
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted 
summary judgment for the defendants.382  The court found that the mere 
sale of an allegedly defectively designed product was not a violation of 
the CPA.383  Only an implied warranty claim, the court found, fit the 
facts alleged by the plaintiffs.384  Plaintiffs’ lawyers in Maryland have 
also tried to masquerade product liability claims as CPA claims in 
respect to a tobacco company’s failure to inform the public of its ability 
to produce a “fire-safe” cigarette.385  This lawsuit met a similarly 
unsuccessful result.386  In that case, the court recognized that “if the 
Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ theory, every product liability claim 
could also be converted into a claim under the MCPA.” 387  The Court 
found no authority for such an expansive application of the statute.388 
The lawsuit that charged that OxyContin did not live up to its 
advertising claims as providing “smooth and sustained” relief provides 
another example of the use of CPAs to escape basic and well-reasoned 
requirements of product liability law.389  In that case, Williams v. Purdue 
Pharma Co., the dispute was essentially a product liability claim, yet the 
complaint alleged a violation of the District of Columbia’s Consumer 
Protection Procedures Act.390  As the defendant observed, “[t]his is a 
product liability suit in which plaintiffs fail to allege any physical 
                                                     
 378. 166 F. Supp. 2d 378, 416–20 (D. Md. 2001). 
 380. Id. at 410–16. 
 381. Id. at 417. 
 382. Id. at 424. 
 383. Id. at 418. 
 384. Id. 
 385. See Sacks v. Phillip-Morris, Inc., No. Civ. A. WMN-95-1840, 1996 WL 780311, at *2 (D. 
Md. Sept. 19, 1996), aff’d, 139 F.3d 842 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 386. See id. at *7 (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
 387. Id. at *2. 
 388. Id. 
 389. See supra notes 291–303 and accompanying text. 
 390. 297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 175 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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injury.”391  Relying on a similar Texas case in which a plaintiff who was 
not injured sued a pharmaceutical manufacturer for not including 
warnings of the potential for liver damage and on grounds that the drug 
was defective on its labeling, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia agreed and dismissed the claim.392 
Courts should continue to hold this common-sense line.  When a 
claim sounds in product liability or contract law, or addresses an area 
traditionally addressed through enforcement of environmental or other 
statutory means, courts should not permit plaintiffs to use CPAs to 
eliminate well-reasoned requirements for a prima facie claim.  The 
legislative history of CPAs clearly shows that they were meant to address 
typical consumer transactions, not product design or “unfair” practices in 
other areas. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION MAY BE NEEDED IN SOME STATES 
Although courts have a great degree of flexibility in interpreting 
CPAs, in some instances the plain language of the statute may limit a 
court’s ability to adopt the common-sense interpretation suggested by 
this Article. 
In some states, the elements of a claim are clearly set by statute.  For 
example, the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act permits recovery “whether 
or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged 
thereby.”393  District of Columbia law permits recovery for about thirty 
broadly described unfair trade practices regardless of “whether or not any 
consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby.”394  North 
Dakota’s statute requires an intent that others rely on a representation in 
connection with a sale or advertisement, “whether or not any person has 
in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby.”395  West Virginia 
law requires an intent that others rely on a statement in some cases, 
requires a “likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding” in others,396 
and does not require actual reliance by the consumer in any case.397 
                                                     
 391. Id. at 175–76. 
 392. See id. at 177–78 (citing Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
 393. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(a) (1999). 
 394. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3904, -3905(k)(1) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 395. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (1999) (stating that the use of “any deceptive act of 
practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation, with the intent that others rely 
thereon in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise” is an unlawful practice). 
 396. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-102(7) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005). 
 397. See id. § 46A-6-106(a) (allowing “any person who purchases or leases goods or services 
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In other states, statutes require an award of treble damages398 or 
attorneys’ fees399 to every prevailing plaintiff.  Courts in such states may 
lack discretion to limit such awards based on whether the defendant 
knowingly or intentionally violated the statute, or to award some amount 
less than three times actual damages or full attorneys’ fees where fairness 
dictates. 
When courts find their hands tied by fossilized statutory language, 
legislators should intervene to restore common sense and respect the 
clear and sound divide between actions by government, which protect the 
public, and private causes of action, which should provide recovery only 
for real, individual harms.  The elements of reform to restore this basic 
division will vary from state to state because of the diversity of CPAs.  In 
general, essentials of CPA legislation should include the following 
provisions where needed to adjust statutory language: 
 
• A showing that the plaintiff actually relied on the alleged 
misrepresentation and that the plaintiff’s reliance was 
objectively reasonable; 
• A requirement that the plaintiff show that he or she was 
actually injured with proof of monetary damages; 
• Treble damages should be discretionary and not be awarded 
to every prevailing plaintiff regardless of whether the 
defendant acted intentionally or made an innocent mistake.  
Damages of up to three times actual damages may continue 
to be awarded if there is proof that the defendant intended to 
deceive the public.  Legislation might set a “clear and 
convincing” evidence standard for an award of treble 
damages, consistent with many state laws providing for the 
award of punitive damages.  Legislation might also clarify 
that punitive or exemplary damages are not available in 
private rights of action, as they are duplicative of treble 
damages; 
• An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to 
prevailing plaintiffs should continue to be available but 
should be discretionary, not required.  A court should be able 
to award fees and costs to both prevailing plaintiffs and 
                                                                                                                       
and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss” as a result of an act declared to be unlawful to bring an 
action). 
 398. See supra note 120. 
 399. See supra note 130. 
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defendants when it finds that exceptional circumstances 
warrant such an award; 
• Where statutory damages (a minimum amount set by statute 
regardless of actual injury) are available, class action 
lawsuits should be prohibited.  CPAs that continue to 
provide for class action relief should be amended to 
emphasize the need for class actions to meet ordinary civil 
procedure requirements, including the requirement that 
common issues of fact and law predominate over other 
issues in the lawsuit, such as individual reliance, causation, 
and damages.  In no circumstance should statutory damages 
be available in class action lawsuits; and 
• A statute of limitations that runs the greater of three years 
from the occurrence of the alleged unfair or deceptive act or 
violation of the statute or one year from when the consumer 
discovered or reasonably should have discovered a loss 
resulting from an act or practice declared unlawful by the 
CPA. 
 
These principles are encompassed in model legislation recently 
developed by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a 
non-partisan membership organization of state legislators.400  This 
“Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes” is 
attached as an appendix.  Again, courts can take the lead in restoring 
balance to CPAs through reasonable statutory interpretation.  State 
legislators need only consider passing legislation when the language of 
the existing statute is so explicit that it does not provide sufficient 
judicial discretion or when the state judiciary has demonstrated a firm 
unwillingness to interpret that statute in a manner that reflects sound 
public policy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is a crucial difference between government enforcement of 
CPAs to protect the general public and private lawsuits that award 
damages to an individual.  As Congress envisioned when it passed the 
FTC Act, if a business commits a trade practice found to be unfair or 
deceptive, it should be told to stop, and if it does not stop, it should be 
 
                                                     
 400. For more information about ALEC, see http://www.alec.org. 
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punished.  Those injured by such practices should receive reimbursement 
reflecting their actual loss. 
Private lawsuits operate very differently than government 
enforcement.  Private lawsuits are retrospective and often impose 
damages in excess of actual damages.  While fundamental elements of 
misrepresentation claims such as reliance, injury, and causation may be 
properly set aside when the government proactively seeks to stop an 
unfair or deceptive practice before someone is harmed, relieving private 
individuals of these requirements results in awards to those who have not 
been injured, and may not have even seen the representation at issue.  
Improper class action certification under CPAs can result in severe 
miscarriages of justice given the great diversity of state laws, the 
individual showing that should be required for each plaintiff, and the 
potential for attorneys to receive an extraordinary windfall for minor 
transgressions when statutory or treble damages are available or required. 
The vague wording of CPAs often provides courts with clear public-
policy choices.  Most leave room for interpretation of the elements 
required to state a private cause of action, such as the need to show 
actual reliance.  Several provide discretion as to when treble damages or 
attorneys’ fees are to be awarded.  Few specifically authorize class 
actions or discuss the availability of statutory damages in such cases.  
Courts should apply common-sense interpretations to CPAs that 
recognize the fundamental requirements of private claims, discourage 
forum shopping and extraterritorial application, and protect against CPAs 
morphing into a universal cause of action.  When courts find that 
statutory language does not permit them to apply the law based on sound 
public policy that distinguishes between public law and private claims, 
state legislators should intervene.  As this Article has shown, the 
overwhelming majority of California voters appreciated this vital 
distinction of law. 
VIII. APPENDIX 
Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection 
Statutes 
As Adopted by Unanimous Vote of the ALEC Civil Justice Task Force 
State consumer protection statutes, frequently known as “unfair and 
deceptive trade practices acts,” vary widely from state to state.  ALEC’s 
Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes 
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structures the private right of action under such laws to reflect sound 
public policy.  Legislation based on the model act must be carefully 
drafted to fit within the state’s existing statutory scheme.  Cross-
references to the state’s existing definition of an unlawful act or practice, 
optional language, and language that may be altered to fit the preference 
of the sponsor or consistency with state law are presented in brackets. 
Section 1. Private Right of Action. 
 (a) A person who reasonably relies upon an act or practice declared 
unlawful by [SECTION] in entering into a transaction and thereby 
suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property may bring an action 
under this Act to enjoin further violations, or to recover as damages the 
out-of-pocket loss the person sustained as a result of such act or practice, 
or both.  The “out-of-pocket loss” shall be no more than the difference 
between what the person paid for the product or service and what the 
product or service was actually worth in the absence of the unlawful act 
or practice. 
(b) At least ten days prior to the commencement of any action 
brought under this section, any person intending to bring such an action 
shall notify the prospective defendant of the intended action, and give the 
prospective defendant an opportunity to confer with the person, the 
person’s counsel, or other representative as to the proposed action.  Such 
notice shall be given to the prospective defendant by mail, postage 
prepaid, to the prospective defendant’s usual place of business, or if the 
prospective defendant has no usual place of business, to the prospective 
defendant’s last known address. 
IN STATES PROVIDING FOR AND OPTING TO MAINTAIN 
TREBLE DAMAGES, INCLUDE PARAGRAPHS (c) AND (d): 
(c) If the [court OR trier of fact] finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the use or employment of the act or practice declared 
unlawful by [SECTION] was willful with the purpose of deceiving the 
public, the court may award up to three (3) times the actual damages 
sustained[, or $500 per person, whichever is greater]. 
(d) In determining whether to award enhanced damages under 
Subsection (b) and the amount of such penalty, the [court OR trier of 
fact] shall consider: 
  (1) if the amount of the actual damages awarded would have a 
deterrent effect upon the defendant; 
  (2) the seriousness of the violation, including the nature, 
circumstances, frequency, and gravity of any prohibited act 
or practice; 
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  (3) the history of previous violations; 
  (4) the good faith of the person found to have violated the Act, 
including whether the person took prompt and appropriate 
remedial action upon learning of the alleged violation; and 
 (5) any other matter that justice may require. 
(e) Any person who is entitled to bring an action under Subsection 
(a) on his or her own behalf against an alleged violator of this act for 
damages for an act or practice declared unlawful by [SECTION] may 
bring a class action against such person on behalf of any class of persons 
of which he or she is a member and which has been damaged by such act 
or practice, subject to and pursuant to the [STATE] Rules of Civil 
Procedure governing class actions.  [In any such class action, the court 
shall not award statutory damages, but recovery shall be limited to actual 
out-of-pocket loss suffered by the person or persons.]401  This paragraph 
is not intended to create or otherwise permit class action relief where not 
permitted by state law.402 
(f)  Punitive or exemplary damages are not permitted in an action 
maintained under this Section. 
Section 2.  Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. 
The court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to: 
(a) A prevailing plaintiff upon a finding [by the court OR trier of 
fact] that the defendant’s use or employment of the act or practice 
declared unlawful by [SECTION] was willful with the purpose of 
deceiving the public, 
(b) A prevailing defendant upon a finding by the court that the 
action was groundless in fact or law or brought in bad faith, or brought 
for the purpose of harassment. 
Section 3.  Limitation of Actions. 
No action may be brought more than one (1) year after the person 
bringing the action discovers or reasonably should have discovered a loss 
resulting from an act or practice declared unlawful by [SECTION], but in 
no event may any action be brought under this chapter more than [four 
                                                     
 401. This provision is needed only in states that opt to provide statutory damages, a minimum 
award to the plaintiff regardless of the actual injury.  The model act does not provide for statutory 
damages but fully compensates plaintiffs for any out-of-pocket loss. 
 402. Legislation in states that do not currently permit class action lawsuits under their consumer 
protection statute should not include paragraph (e). 
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(4)] years from the first instance of the act or practice giving rise to the 
cause of action. 
Section 4.  Exemptions. 
(a) Nothing in this Act shall apply to: 
  (1) Acts or practices required or permitted by or in accord with 
state or federal law, rule or regulation, judicial or 
administrative decision, or formal or informal agency action; 
  (2) Acts or practices by the publisher, owner, agent or employee 
of a newspaper, periodical, radio or television station or any 
other person without knowledge of the deceptive character 
of the advertisement in the publication or dissemination of 
an advertisement supplied by another; or 
  (3) Acts or practices by a retailer who has, in good faith, 
engaged in the dissemination of claims of a manufacturer or 
wholesaler without actual knowledge that it violated the Act. 
[(b)  Nothing in this Act is intended to create a claim or remedy for a 
violation of a state or federal law, rule or regulation where the legislature 
did not establish a private right of action.]403 
                                                     
 403. This language is needed in states in which courts have permitted use of consumer protection 
statutes to effectively create private rights of action under other statutes or regulations where the 
legislature did not intend to allow private lawsuits. 
